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Glossary 
 
Acronym/Key word Definition 
Moderate drinkers People drinking within the current UK drinking guidelines 
of 14 units per week 
Hazardous 
drinkers 
People exceeding the UK guidelines, but drinking less 
than 50 units per week for men, or 35 for women 
Harmful drinkers People drinking over 50 units a week for men or 35 for 
women 
Welsh Index of 
Multiple 
Deprivation 
(WIMD) 
A small area-level composite measure of socioeconomic 
deprivation accounting for local levels of income, 
employment, health, education, access to services, 
community safety, physical environment and housing. 
On-trade Locations where alcohol is sold for consumption on the 
premises, e.g. pubs and restaurants 
Off-trade Locations where alcohol is sold for consumption off the 
premises, e.g. shops and supermarkets 
Alcohol-related 
health conditions 
Health conditions from which alcohol consumption 
increases (or decreases) the risk of death and/or hospital 
admission1 
Alcohol-
attributable 
outcomes 
Outcomes (e.g. deaths) which would not have occurred 
in the absence of alcohol consumption, i.e. those which 
are directly attributable to alcohol 
 
                                                             
1
 Note that this definition is not the same as the Office for National Statistics definition of ‘Alcohol-Related 
deaths’ which has recently been revised. 
60
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Executive Summary 
Main Conclusions 
Estimates from an updated version of the Welsh adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy 
Model suggest: 
1. A minimum unit price set at between 35 and 70p would be effective in reducing alcohol 
consumption among hazardous and, particularly, harmful drinkers. These consumption 
reductions would lead to reductions in alcohol-related mortality and hospitalisations. 
Higher levels of MUP lead to greater reductions in consumption and harm. 
2. Moderate drinkers would experience only small impacts on their alcohol consumption 
and spending following the introduction of a minimum unit price. This is because they 
tend to buy alcohol which would be subject to little or no increase in price under the 
policy. Higher levels of MUP have larger impacts on the consumption of moderate 
drinkers. 
3. The greatest impact of a minimum unit price would be on the most deprived harmful 
drinkers. Deprived drinkers consuming at moderate levels would be more affected than 
other moderate drinkers, but the overall impact on their alcohol consumption and 
spending remains small.  
4. Large alcohol tax increases would be required to achieve the same effects as a 50p 
minimum unit price. Specifically:  
a. A 33% tax increase would achieve the same reduction in alcohol consumption 
among hazardous and harmful drinkers; 
b. A 48% tax increase would achieve the same reduction in alcohol consumption 
among harmful drinkers; 
c. A 34% tax increase would achieve the same reduction in alcohol-attributable 
deaths among hazardous and harmful drinkers; 
d. A 47% tax increase would achieve the same reduction in alcohol-attributable 
deaths among harmful drinkers. 
5. The effects of the above tax increases would be distributed differently across the 
population compared to a 50p minimum unit price. The above tax increases all lead to 
larger reductions in alcohol consumption and larger increases in alcohol spending 
among moderate drinkers and less deprived drinkers. For more deprived drinkers, the 
above tax increases still lead to larger increases in alcohol spending but lead to smaller 
reductions in this group’s alcohol consumption.    
6. This pattern of consumption changes means reductions in alcohol-related harm are less 
concentrated in deprived groups than would be the case under a 50p minimum unit 
price. Therefore, the reduction in alcohol-attributable health inequalities will be smaller 
for the above tax increases than for a 50p minimum unit price. 
 
Research aims 
This report was commissioned in June 2017 by the Welsh Government. It uses newly available 
datasets to update our previously published analyses of the potential impact on the population 
and population subgroups of different levels of minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol in Wales. 
In particular, newly available data on alcohol consumption, from the 2016-17 National Survey for 
Wales, is included. The report also includes new analyses of the increases in alcohol taxation 
required to achieve the same effects on key outcomes as a 50p minimum unit price. Finally, it 
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examines how the effects of minimum unit pricing and tax increases are differently distributed 
across key population subgroups.  
Summary of model findings 
Baseline alcohol consumption, related harm and purchasing in Wales 
M1. 20% of the Welsh adult population are abstainers, 58% are moderate drinkers, 19% are 
hazardous drinkers and 3% are harmful drinkers. The 22% of the population who are hazardous 
or harmful drinkers consume 75% of all alcohol drunk by the Welsh population. The 3% who are 
harmful drinkers consume 27% of all alcohol consumed by the Welsh population.  
M2. Moderate drinkers consume an average of 211 units of alcohol per year compared to 
1,236 for hazardous drinkers and 3,924 for harmful drinkers.  Moderate drinkers spend an 
average of £276 per year on this alcohol compared to £1,209 for hazardous drinkers and £2,882 
for harmful drinkers.  
M3.  The abstention rate is higher in the most deprived quintile of the Welsh population 
(26.7%) than in the least deprived quintile (13.9%). However, average annual consumption 
among drinkers is higher in the least and second-least deprived quintiles (648 and 649 units per 
year respectively) than the most deprived quintiles (546 units per year).   
M4.  The population buys 37% of its alcohol for less than 50p per unit and 15% for less than 
40p per unit.  Heavier drinkers are more likely to buy alcohol sold below these thresholds. 
Moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers respectively buy 22%, 36% and 46% of their alcohol 
for less than 50p per unit and 9%, 14% and 19% of their alcohol for less than 40p per unit.  
M5. Alcohol sold for less than 50p per unit is largely sold in the off-trade. Only 2% of on-trade 
alcohol is sold for less than 50p per unit compared to 47% of off-trade alcohol. Comparing 
across off-trade beverage types, 62% of beer, 73% of cider, 32% of wine and 60% of spirits are 
sold for less than 50p per unit. Also in the off-trade, 19% of all alcohol, 34% of beer, 56% of 
cider, 8% of wine and 19% of spirits are sold for less than 40p per unit.  
M6.  There are an estimated 777 alcohol-attributable deaths per year in Wales and 35,637 
alcohol-attributable hospital admissions. Liver disease and cancers account for the greatest 
proportion of alcohol-attributable deaths. Hypertension and mental or behavioural disorders due 
to alcohol account for the greatest proportion of alcohol-attributable hospital admissions.  
M7.  Alcohol-attributable deaths and hospital admissions are concentrated in hazardous and, 
particularly, harmful drinkers and particularly harmful drinkers who are more deprived. Among 
the most deprived quintile, 5.0% of all deaths are attributable to alcohol compared to 3.2% for 
the next most deprived quintile and 2.2% for the least deprived.  
M9. There are an estimated 88,908 crimes attributable to alcohol per year. An estimated 
42,440 of these are committed by hazardous drinkers compared to 38,057 by moderate drinkers 
and 8,411 by harmful drinkers.  
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Modelled effects of minimum unit pricing on alcohol consumption, spending and revenue 
M10. Introducing a 50p MUP in Wales would be associated with an estimated 3.6% fall in 
consumption, equivalent to 22.0 units per drinker per year. Estimated reductions in consumption 
for other levels of MUP range from 0.8% (4.9 units per drinker per year) for a 35p MUP to 10.7% 
(65.4 units per drinker per year) for a 70p MUP. For the remainder of this executive summary, 
we focus on a 50p MUP, as this has been the example level used and the focus of much of the 
policy debate. Full results for other MUP levels can be found in the main report and, in general, 
policy effects are larger for higher minimum prices. 
M11. Consumption reductions under a 50p MUP are estimated to be largest among harmful 
drinkers (6.8%, 268.7 units per drinker per year) and hazardous drinkers (3.0%, 37.4 units per 
drinker per year). The smallest effects would be seen among moderate drinkers (1.1%, 2.4 units 
per drinker per year).   
M12. Consumption reductions under a 50p MUP are also estimated to be largest among the 
most deprived quintile of drinkers (12.6%, 68.7 units per drinker per year) with a reduced effect 
among the next most deprived quintile (4.1%, 23.9 units per drinker per year) and small effects 
among the least deprived quintile (0.3%, 1.9 units per drinker per year).   
M13.  Of the total reduction in units consumed under a 50p MUP, 52% would occur among 
harmful drinkers, 40% among hazardous drinkers and 8% among moderate drinkers. Drinkers 
from the most deprived quintile would account for 50% of the reduction in units consumed; 
however, approximately two-thirds of this would be among harmful drinkers in this quintile.  
M14. Following these consumption changes, spending on alcohol is estimated to increase by 
1.4% or £8 per drinker per year under a 50p MUP. The largest spending increases would be 
seen among harmful drinkers (1.7%, £48 per drinker per year) with smaller increases seen for 
hazardous drinkers (1.5%, £18 per drinker per year) and moderate drinkers (1.1%, £3 per 
drinker per year).   
M15.  Those in the most deprived quintile are estimated to reduce their spending on alcohol by 
1.5% or £7 per drinker per year, following the above consumption changes. Drinkers in other 
deprivation quintiles are estimated to increase their spending by between £9 and £13 per 
drinker per year. 
M16.  Annual revenue to the exchequer from alcohol duties and VAT in Wales is estimated to 
fall by 0.4% or £1.9m following the introduction of a 50p MUP. Total annual revenue to retailers 
from alcohol sales is estimated to increase by 9.9% or £16.8m in the off-trade and 0.2% or £1m 
in the on-trade.    
Modelled effects of minimum unit pricing on alcohol-related harm 
M17.  A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to 66 or 8.5% fewer alcohol-attributable deaths per year 
and 1,281 or 3.6% fewer alcohol-attributable hospital admissions per year.   
M18.  Of the total reduction in deaths arising from a 50p MUP, an estimated 69% occur among 
harmful drinkers, 57% occur among the most deprived quintile and 45% occur among harmful 
drinkers in the most deprived quintile. The equivalent figures for reductions in alcohol-
attributable hospital admissions are 44%, 49% and 24%; suggesting reductions in hospital 
admissions remain concentrated in the highest risk groups but are somewhat more widely 
distributed across the population.   
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M19.  Each year, there are currently an estimated 46.4 more alcohol-attributable deaths per 
100,000 drinkers in the most deprived quintile in Wales than the least deprived. The above 
pattern of mortality reductions under a 50p MUP reduces this inequality gap by an estimated 
26% to 34.2 extra deaths per 100,000 drinkers per year.  
M20. A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to 2.4% or 2,093 fewer alcohol-attributable crimes per 
year. The largest reduction is seen in crimes committed by hazardous drinkers at 3.0% or 1,277 
fewer crimes per year, compared to 1.7% or 657 fewer crimes per year for moderate drinkers 
and 1.9% or 159 fewer crimes per year for harmful drinkers. 
M21. The number of working days lost to alcohol-attributable workplace absences is estimated 
to fall by 1.9% or 9,808 days per year under a 50p MUP. The largest reduction is seen in days 
absent for hazardous drinkers at 2.7% or 6,138 fewer days absent per year, compared to 1.2% 
or 2,621 fewer days absent per year for moderate drinkers and 1.6% or 1,049 fewer days 
absent per year for harmful drinkers. 
M22.  The discounted total reduction in societal costs of alcohol over 20 years arising from 
these reductions in alcohol-attributable harm is £783m or a reduction in total costs of 4.7%. This 
is comprised of a 4.6% or £91m reduction in direct healthcare costs, a 7.5% or £490m reduction 
in losses of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), a 2.5% or £188m reduction in the direct and 
QALY-related costs of crime and a 2.1% or £14m reduction in costs associated with workplace 
absences.  
Comparing the modelled effects of minimum unit pricing and alcohol taxation increases 
M23. A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to hazardous and harmful drinkers consuming an 
average of 73 fewer units per drinker per year. An estimated 33% increase in alcohol taxes 
would be required to achieve the same effect. Tax increases of 34%, 47% and 48% respectively 
would be required to achieve the same effects as a 50p MUP on consumption among harmful 
drinkers only, alcohol-attributable deaths among hazardous and harmful drinkers, and alcohol-
attributable deaths among harmful drinkers only.  
M24.  The above alcohol tax increases are estimated to have larger impacts on alcohol 
consumption among moderate drinkers than a 50p MUP. A 50p MUP is estimated to reduce 
consumption among moderate drinkers by 1.1% whereas tax increases of 33%, 34%, 46% and 
47% are estimated to reduce consumption among moderate drinkers by 3.1%, 3.2%, 4.5% and 
4.6% respectively. However, the absolute size of these consumption reductions remains small 
at between 7 and 10 units per drinker per year compared to 2 units per drinker per year for a 
50p MUP.  
M25. In contrast, the above tax increases are estimated to have smaller impacts on alcohol 
consumption among the most deprived drinkers than a 50p MUP. A 50p MUP is estimated to 
reduce consumption among the most deprived drinkers by 12.6% whereas tax increases of 
33%, 34%, 46% and 47% are estimated to reduce consumption among moderate drinkers by 
6.9%, 7.1%, 9.8% and 10.2% respectively. The absolute size of these consumption reductions 
ranges between 37 and 56 units per drinker per year compared to 69 units per drinker per year 
for a 50p MUP.  
M26.  The above alcohol tax increases are estimated to lead to larger increases in alcohol 
spending across all drinker groups, after consumption changes, than a 50p MUP.  Estimated 
increases in spending under a 50p MUP range between 1.1% or £3 and 1.7% or £48. For the 
tax increases, estimated changes in spending range between increases of 5.7% or £16 and 
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increases of 10.5% or £303. The same is true across all deprivation groups, with MUP 
estimated to change spending by between a decrease of 1.5% or £7 and an increases of 1.9% 
or £13, compared to increases of between 4.8% or £21 and 9.6% or £72†. 
M27.  The above alcohol tax increases are estimated to lead to an increase in revenue to the 
exchequer of between 21.0% or £101m and 29.8% or £144m per year. This compares to a 
decrease in revenue of 0.4% or £1.9m under a 50p MUP.  
M28. The impact on revenue to off-trade retailers is estimated to range between decreases of 
10.5% or £18m and decreases of 15.4% or £26m. This compares to increases of 9.9% or £17m 
under a 50p MUP. For on-trade retailers, the estimated impact of the tax changes on revenue 
ranges between decreases of 2.2% or £11m and decreases of 3.2% or £16m. This compares to 
increases of 0.2% or £1m under a 50p MUP.  
M29. Reductions in alcohol-attributable mortality and hospital admissions arising from the 
above tax increases would still be concentrated among the most deprived and harmful drinkers 
but to a lesser extent than under a 50p MUP. This reflects the pattern of consumption 
reductions described above. As a result, the inequality gap in alcohol-attributable mortality 
between the most and least deprived group would fall from 46.4 extra deaths per 100,000 
drinkers in the most deprived group per year at baseline to 34.2 extra deaths under a 50p MUP 
but would only fall to between 39.3 and 41.5 extra deaths under the tax increases. This 
suggests alcohol-attributable health inequalities would fall by a greater amount under a 50p 
MUP than the above tax changes.  
  
                                                             
†
 Note that the largest (or smallest) relative spending change may not be in the same group as the largest 
(or smallest) absolute spending change. 
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Introduction 
In June 2017, the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group (SARG) at University of Sheffield were 
commissioned by the Welsh Government to model the potential impact of a Minimum Unit 
Pricing (MUP) policy for alcohol and how this might compare to rises in alcohol duty. This work 
builds on previous modelling work undertaken by SARG in 20141 and involves the adaptation of 
the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model v3.5 (SAPM) to Wales. SAPM is an alcohol policy appraisal 
tool which has been widely used to examine the potential impact of alcohol pricing policies, 
including both taxation and Minimum Unit Pricing 2,3, restrictions on availability and marketing 4 
and delivery of Screening and Brief Intervention programmes 5,6 on a broad range of outcomes 
of relevance to policy makers. The outcomes assessed include the estimated impacts on 
alcohol consumption, exchequer revenue, mortality, hospital admissions, healthcare costs, 
crime volumes and costs and workplace productivity. Versions of SAPM have been developed 
and adapted for a broad range of countries including England 7,8, Wales 1, Scotland 9,10, 
Northern Ireland 11, the Republic of Ireland 12, Canada 13 and Italy 14. 
The specific research questions to be addressed in this new analysis for Wales are: 
1. To use new data and new modelling approaches to provide new estimates of the impact 
of a MUP (at levels in 5p increments from 35-70p) on alcohol consumption, spending, 
health, crime and workplace outcomes, and how these impacts will vary across different 
levels of drinking and deprivation. 
2. To establish the proportional increases in alcohol duty which would be required to 
achieve the same reduction in the alcohol consumption of hazardous and harmful 
drinkers combined (those drinking over the current UK drinking guidelines) and harmful 
drinkers alone (those drinking over 50 units/week for men and 35 units/week for women) 
as a 50p MUP and to illustrate how the impact of these two policies (MUP and duty 
rises) are distributed differently across the population. 
3. To establish the proportional increases in alcohol duty which would be required to 
achieve the same reduction in alcohol-attributable deaths among hazardous and harmful 
drinkers and harmful drinkers alone as a 50p MUP and illustrate the differences in 
distribution of impact across the population. 
A short report providing preliminary results from this modelling, focussing on the impact of an 
illustrative example 50p MUP policy on health outcomes only was published in November 2017 
15. The current report presents the final analysis addressing the three research questions set out 
above. 
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Methods 
Model overview 
The Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model is a deterministic economic and epidemiological policy 
appraisal tool which operates as a series of linked models to explore the potential impact of a 
range of alcohol policy options on a broad spectrum of outcome measures. Critically, SAPM 
also provides estimates of the distribution of policy impacts across different groups in the 
population. 
Briefly, SAPM operates in the following steps when modelling the impact of a pricing-based 
policy: 
1. Model the current distribution of alcohol consumption, preferences for different types of 
alcoholic beverage and prices paid 
2. Model the impact of a policy on the distribution of alcohol prices 
3. Model the impact of these changes on alcohol consumption in both the on- and off-
trades‡ 
4. Model the impact of these changes in consumption on consumer spending and revenue 
for retailers and the exchequer 
5. Model the current scale and distribution of alcohol-related harm (in terms of the impact 
on health, crime and workplace outcomes) 
6. Model the impact of changes in alcohol consumption on risk of alcohol-related health 
outcomes 
7. Model the impact of these changes in risk on mortality rates, population health, hospital 
admission levels and associated healthcare costs 
8. Model the impact of these changes in alcohol consumption on alcohol-related crime and 
associated costs to society (in terms of both direct policing costs and the negative 
impact of crime on the health of victims) 
9. Model the impact of these changes in alcohol consumption on workplace absence and 
associated costs to society 
These steps are operationalised in two linked models. The first, primarily economic model, 
covers steps 1-4, while the second, primarily epidemiological model, covers steps 5-9. 
Throughout both models, consideration is given to both levels and patterns of alcohol 
consumption, and how these and other baseline characteristics vary across the population. In 
the version of SAPM used for the present analysis (SAPM v3.5), this heterogeneity is modelled 
across sex, age (in 4 groups – 18-24, 25-34, 35-55 and 55+ years old) and quintiles of the 
Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD), a multi-component area-based measure of 
deprivation calculated by the Welsh Government 16. In addition, the model is further stratified 
into three drinker groups: 
 Moderate drinkers (those drinking within the current UK Chief Medical Officer’s 
guidelines of 14 units per week) 
 Hazardous drinkers (those exceeding the current guidelines, but drinking no more than 
35 units per week in the case of women or 50 units per week for men) 
                                                             
‡
 ‘On-trade’ refers to outlets, such as pubs and restaurants, where alcohol is sold for consumption on the 
premises. ‘Off-trade’ refers to outlets, such as shops and supermarkets, where alcohol is sold for 
consumption elsewhere. 
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 Harmful drinkers (women drinking more than 35 units per week or men drinking more 
than 50 units per week) 
A detailed description of the modelling methodology that underpins both of these models can be 
found in the 2014 report for Wales 1 and in other more recent publications 3,10,17. This report 
describes only the data sources which are used to populate the model and key changes since 
2014. 
Data 
The Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model synthesises data from a wide range of sources. These are 
outlined briefly below: 
Population data 
Data on the number of adults (aged 18+) living in Wales by age (in single years), sex and 
deprivation (measured in quintiles of the Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD)) was 
obtained from the Office for National Statistics’ mid-year population estimates for 2015 for every 
Lower Super Output Area§ in Wales 18 combined with WIMD rankings from StatsWales 19. 
Alcohol consumption data 
Individual-level self-reported alcohol consumption data for Wales was obtained from the 2016-
17 National Survey for Wales (NSW), provided directly by the Welsh Government. 
Alcohol pricing data 
Individual transaction-level self-reported alcohol purchasing data for Wales and England (as the 
Welsh sample alone was insufficiently large) was obtained from the 2010-15 (pooled) Living 
Costs and Food Survey, provided by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs and the Office for National Statistics. This data was inflated to 2016 prices using alcohol-
specific inflation indices published by the Office for National Statistics 20. The data was then 
calibrated to beverage-specific off-trade sales pricing data for the Wales and West TV region for 
2016 from The Nielsen Company provided by the Welsh Government. As it is necessary to align 
this data (which includes data on household income, but not on WIMD) with the consumption 
data from the NSW (which includes data on WIMD, but not on household income), we have had 
to assume that purchasing patterns in each quintile of equivalised household income are 
equivalent to those in the equivalent WIMD quintile. The resulting population-level distribution of 
prices by beverage type (beer, cider, wine and spirits) and channel (on- and off-trade) are 
shown in Figure 1. 
                                                             
§
 A geographical unit with a  population of around 1,500 at which WIMD rankings are calculated 
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Figure 1: Cumulative distributions of prices paid for alcohol by channel and beverage type (LCFS 2010-15 and 
Nielsen 2016) 
 
Price elasticities 
Price elasticities, which estimate the proportional change in alcohol consumption following a 
proportional change in alcohol prices were taken from published estimates derived using data 
from England and Wales 21. 
Tax passthrough rates 
Estimates of the extent to which increases in alcohol duty rates are passed through to 
customers as increases in price for the off-trade were taken from published estimates derived 
using data from England 22. These rates are illustrated in Figure 2. No similar estimates exist for 
the on-trade and we therefore assume any increases in duty are passed through in full to the 
customer (a passthrough rate of 1). This assumption is likely to lead to an overestimation of the 
impact of tax policies, as there is limited evidence to suggest that passthrough rates in the on-
trade are lower than those in the off-trade 23, i.e. that on-trade retailers absorb a greater 
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proportion of any duty increases rather than pass them on to customers, however the precise 
extent to which this may be the case is unclear. 
Figure 2: Estimated rates at which duty increases are passed through to off-trade alcohol prices taken from Ally et 
al.(2014) 
 
Mortality data 
Mortality records for 43 alcohol-related health conditions (listed in Table 1), and for all other 
causes combined, for Wales for the years 2014-16 were obtained from the Office for National 
Statistics 24. These figures were stratified by age group (18-24, 25-34, 35-54, 55+), sex and 
WIMD quintiles. 
Morbidity data 
Hospital admission records, corrected for repeat admissions by the same individuals in the 
same year, for 43 alcohol-related health conditions for Wales for the years 2014-16 were 
obtained from NHS Wales Informatics Services (NWIS). The same data was also analysed to 
produce estimates of the average number of hospital admissions in a year for an individual with 
each of the 43 health conditions included in the model. 
Healthcare costs data 
Estimates of the average annual NHS costs associated with each of the 43 modelled health 
conditions were taken from published figures for England and Wales and inflated to 2016 prices 
using the Personal Social Services Research Unit’s (PSSRU) Hospital and Community Health 
Services (HCHS) index 25. These costs, alongside observed annual mortality and admission 
volumes for Wales for each condition are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Alcohol-related health conditions included in SAPM3.5 with baseline volumes and costs 
Condition ICD-10 code 
Average annual 
number of 
deaths (2014-
16) 
Average annual 
number of 
admissions (2014-
16) 
Mean 
admissions per 
year per 
individual 
Mean annual 
cost per 
patient to 
NHS 
Estimated total 
annual cost to 
NHS 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome E24.4 0 1 1.00 £6,709 £4,472 
Degeneration G31.2 0 43 2.15 £19,519 £390,385 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 0 27 2.05 £12,164 £162,189 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 0 7 1.50 £15,013 £70,063 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I42.6 4 87 2.02 £9,929 £426,940 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 0 100 1.55 £14,398 £926,255 
Alcoholic liver disease K70 309 3,330 2.10 £5,346 £8,495,020 
Acute pancreatitis K85.2 2 181 1.57 £8,361 £964,339 
Chronic pancreatitis (alcohol induced) K86.0 1 256 2.17 £22,332 £2,635,191 
Maternal care for (suspected) damage to 
foetus from alcohol  
O35.4 0 0 1.00 £8,361 £0 
Mental and Behavioural disorders due to use 
of alcohol 
F10 29 9,332 1.45 £6,867 £44,054,369 
Excessive Blood Level of Alcohol R78.0 0 19 1.18 £8,361 £136,568 
Toxic effect of Alcohol T51.0, T51.1, T51.9 1 1,678 1.29 £6,222 £8,122,159 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to alcohol X45 20 8 1.14 £2,084 £15,282 
Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to 
alcohol 
X65 0 23 1.26 £8,361 £150,504 
Poisoning by and exposure to alcohol, 
undetermined intent 
Y15 0 2 1.00 £8,361 £19,510 
Evidence of alcohol involvement determined 
by blood alcohol level 
Y90 0 9 1.13 £8,361 £64,103 
Tuberculosis A15-A19 10 128 1.44 £8,361 £741,371 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and 
pharynx 
C00-C14 141 1,647 2.69 £9,655 £5,909,097 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 415 2,040 2.61 £7,116 £5,562,271 
Malignant neoplasm of colon and rectum C18-C21 854 4,993 2.38 £10,248 £21,523,404 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic 
bile ducts 
C22 266 439 2.44 £7,292 £1,312,576 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 42 433 2.45 £6,861 £1,214,310 
Malignant neoplasm of breast  C50 509 5,458 1.82 £5,193 £15,551,138 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) E10-E14 271 24,449 2.04 £6,098 £73,234,384 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 39 10,660 1.68 £9,060 £57,478,347 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I13 224 124,383 1.56 £5,795 £462,683,976 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 3,284 23,308 2.00 £5,283 £61,655,939 
Cardiac arrhythmias I47-I48 221 36,345 1.83 £8,266 £164,443,732 
Haemorrhagic and other non-ischaemic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 462 1,108 1.57 £6,631 £4,692,584 
Ischaemic stroke I63-I66, I69.3-I69.4 877 3,019 1.75 £8,669 £14,977,320 
Lower respiratory infections: pneumonia J10.0, J11.0, J12-J15, J18 1,323 11,215 1.40 £8,361 £66,865,501 
Cirrhosis of the liver K73-K74 116 1,851 1.88 £5,310 £5,228,374 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 
K85-K86 excluding K85.2, 
K86.0 
67 3,009 1.57 £5,728 £10,998,791 
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Condition ICD-10 code 
Average annual 
number of 
deaths (2014-
16) 
Average annual 
number of 
admissions (2014-
16) 
Mean 
admissions per 
year per 
individual 
Mean annual 
cost per 
patient to 
NHS 
Estimated total 
annual cost to 
NHS 
Transport injuries (including road traffic 
accidents) 
V01-V98, Y85.0 111 2,167 1.08 £16,826 £33,679,336 
Fall injuries W00-W19 260 10,421 1.21 £4,918 £42,447,793 
Exposure to mechanical forces (including 
machinery accidents) 
W20-W52 6 4,001 1.08 £6,058 £22,549,669 
Drowning W65-W74 16 7 1.18 £3,488 £19,766 
Other Unintentional Injuries 
W75-W99, X30-X33, X50-
X58 
37 0 1.00 £4,212 £0 
Accidental Poisoning by exposure to Noxious 
Substances 
X40-X49 excluding X45 180 839 1.21 £8,361 £5,788,823 
Intentional self-harm 
X60-X84, Y87.0 excluding 
X65 
244 2,441 1.45 £4,879 £8,206,827 
Assault X85 -Y09, Y87.1 11 908 1.09 £5,275 £4,379,796 
Other Intentional Injuries Y35 0 865 1.14 £8,361 £6,371,328 
       
Total 
 
10,354 291,238 
  
£1,164,153,802 
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Health-Related Quality of Life 
Previously published estimates of age- and sex-specific health utility values for each of the 43 
modelled health conditions, and the general population were used, based on analysis of data 
from the Health Outcomes Data Repository (HODaR) 4,26. 
Relationships between alcohol consumption and risk of health harm 
For each of the 17 health conditions in the model which are partially attributable to alcohol and 
for which risk is associated with chronic, rather than acute consumption, estimates of the 
relationship between levels of mean alcohol consumption and risk of harm are taken from the 
scientific literature. These relationships are drawn from a range of recent meta-analysis and are 
aligned with those used in recent international burden of disease studies 27. A full list of the 
sources for each disease and the associated risk equations can be found in Rehm et al. 28. 
Crime volume data 
Data on the total volume of recorded crime in each of the 4 Welsh police forces (Dyfed-Powys, 
Gwent, North Wales and South Wales) for 19 different alcohol-related offences (listed in Table 
2) was obtained from published Home Office figures for 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17 29. 
These figures were adjusted to account for underrecording of the true rates of each offence 
using Home Office estimates of the rate of underrecording 30.  
Offender demographics 
As the published crime volume figures do not give any information on the demographic 
characteristics of the offenders, we obtained a detailed breakdown of the age and sex 
distribution of offenders appearing before any of the 22 magistrates or 4 crown courts in Wales 
for each of the 19 offence categories during 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17 from the Ministry of 
Justice. This is used to apportion the estimated total number of offences across the population, 
under the assumption that the age-sex distribution of those appearing in court matches the age-
sex distribution of offenders. Unfortunately, this data was not available further stratified by 
WIMD quintile of the offender and therefore we have had to assume that offence volumes are 
independent of deprivation, an assumption which may be unlikely to hold true in practice, 
particularly since neighbourhood crime rates are themselves a component of the WIMD 
calculation. 
Costs of crime 
Estimates of the costs to society of each of the 19 offence categories were taken from published 
Home Office figures 30 inflated to 2016 prices using ONS inflation data 20. Note that these 
estimates include both the costs of crime prevention and policing, costs associated with 
prosecution and also an estimate of the financial valuation of the harm caused to the victim and 
these figures should not, therefore, be viewed as an estimate of the direct saving to the police 
and criminal justice system as a result of implementing any policy.  
Alcohol-Attributable Fractions for crime 
Published estimates of the proportion of offences in each category which are attributable to 
alcohol, derived from the Offending Crime and Justice Survey were used 4. These are 
summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Annual estimated crime volumes and costs 
Offence 
Average 
annual 
recorded 
volume 
(2014/15-
2016/17) 
Uprating 
factor to 
account for 
under-
recording 
Estimated 
total annual 
offences 
Estimated 
cost per 
offence 
Estimated 
total annual 
cost 
Male Alcohol-
Attributable 
Fraction 
Female 
Alcohol-
Attributable 
Fraction 
Causing death by careless 
driving under influence of 
drink or drugs 
0 1 0 £1,936,383 £0 100.0% 100.0% 
Assault with intent to cause 
serious harm/endangering life 
1,564 1.5 2,346 £28,576 £67,039,358 11.3% 28.3% 
Assault with injury 21,543 1.5 32,315 £10,866 £351,125,250 11.3% 28.3% 
Assault without injury 17,833 7.9 140,878 £1,942 £273,625,546 18.0% 14.7% 
Criminal damage 32,078 5.9 189,262 £1,604 £303,638,692 31.1% 34.1% 
Theft from the person 1,749 2.7 4,722 £847 £3,999,018 1.4% 1.3% 
Robbery (Personal) 644 4.8 3,093 £9,778 £30,241,474 1.4% 1.3% 
Robbery (Business) 85 4.8 406 £10,402 £4,227,282 1.4% 1.3% 
Burglary in a dwelling 7,014 2.8 19,639 £4,356 £85,553,674 1.4% 1.3% 
Burglary not in a dwelling 10,177 1.9 19,336 £5,114 £98,891,976 1.4% 1.3% 
Theft of a pedal cycle 3,117 3.6 11,221 £847 £9,502,526 5.3% 51.4% 
Theft from vehicle 10,097 3.5 35,341 £1,266 £44,754,385 5.3% 51.4% 
Aggravated vehicle taking 404 1.3 525 £5,516 £2,897,052 5.3% 51.4% 
Theft of vehicle 2,856 1.3 3,712 £8,331 £30,928,835 5.3% 51.4% 
Other theft 15,769 2.7 42,577 £847 £36,055,942 1.4% 1.3% 
Theft from shops 17,797 16.1 286,537 £138 £39,434,624 1.4% 1.3% 
Violent disorder 17 1.5 26 £19,721 £512,743 14.5% 21.2% 
Sexual offences 5,324 13.6 72,411 £41,012 £2,969,732,307 14.5% 21.2% 
Homicide 29 1 29 £1,936,383 £56,155,104 14.5% 21.2% 
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Employment and absence rates 
The proportion of each age-sex group in the model who are in employment, as opposed to 
being unemployed or economically inactive, was calculated from the Welsh sample of the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from October 2015 – September 2017 (pooled) obtained 
from the Office for National Statistics. This data was also used to produce estimates of the 
average number of scheduled days’ work and the number of day’s absence in the past week. 
Note that as the QLFS does not record drinking behaviour, we have had to assume that drinking 
is independent of rates of employment. 
Costs of workplace absence 
Days of absence from work are valued using the mean gross salary for individuals in each age-
sex group. These are also derived from the QLFS data. 
Alcohol-Attributable Fractions for workplace absence 
No Welsh, or even UK, data could be identified on the proportion of workplace absences which 
were attributable to alcohol. We therefore took self-reported estimates of these figures, broken 
down by age and sex, from published figures for Ireland, derived from the National Alcohol Diary 
Survey 2013 12. These are presented in Table 3 alongside annual absence rates. Note that 
these estimates are based on individuals own attribution of their absence to alcohol, so may 
underestimate the true absence burden of alcohol as survey respondents may not have 
attributed some alcohol-attributable health problems that caused them to miss work as being 
directly caused by alcohol. 
Table 3: Estimates employment and workplace absence rates 
 
Population 
Employment 
rate 
Average 
working 
days 
per 
week 
Overall 
absence 
rate 
Mean gross 
annual 
income 
Alcohol-
Attributable 
Fraction 
Male 
18-24 151,280 61.9% 4.58 1.1% £15,343 36% 
25-34 190,819 85.3% 4.92 0.6% £23,591 23% 
35-54 390,106 87.5% 4.90 1.1% £31,238 8% 
55+ 464,123 34.6% 4.78 2.2% £28,952 10% 
Female 
18-24 141,168 61.2% 4.10 1.0% £12,048 33% 
25-34 187,475 75.4% 4.30 1.7% £18,100 9% 
35-54 404,204 79.7% 4.38 2.1% £21,059 4% 
55+ 521,820 25.6% 4.25 1.7% £18,124 0% 
Population 2,450,995 58.7% 4.60 1.5% £22,796 12% 
 
Changes since the 2014 report 
As illustrated in the previous section, there have been significant changes to the data used in 
SAPM since the 2014 report. The most significant of these changes are the use of a large, 
recent survey on alcohol consumption, the 2016-17 National Survey for Wales, in place of a 
much smaller sample of data from the 2008-11 General Household Surveys. In addition, the use 
of much more recent alcohol purchasing data (2010-15 rather than 2001-09) is a significant 
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advance. There have also  been notable changes in the relationships between alcohol 
consumption and harm taken from the international literature, particularly for cancers where 
there has been a significant increase in the evidence base in recent years 31 and for Ischaemic 
Heart Disease, where new evidence has shown that episodic heavy drinking removes any 
protective effects conferred by moderate levels of consumption 32,33. 
In addition to these improvements in the data used in the model, this report also looks at the 
impact of increasing taxation on alcohol consumption and resulting health, crime and workplace 
outcomes. Modelling the impact of duty changes on alcohol prices is achieved through adjusting 
the transaction level data from the Living Costs and Food Survey described in the data section. 
The first step in this process is to estimate the effective rates of duty per unit of alcohol for each 
beverage type in the model (beer, cider, wine, spirits and Ready-To-Drinks** (RTDs)). These are 
based on the latest (effective March 2017) duty rates, however some beverage types (e.g. beer) 
have differential duty rates depending on their alcoholic strength. For these products, we use 
data from the Nielsen Company on the proportion of alcohol sold at particularly high and low 
strengths to calculate a weighted average duty rate per unit. As cider and wine are taxed based 
on the volume of product, not their alcoholic strength, we assume ABVs based on market 
research data. Details of these assumptions and the resulting estimates of the tax per unit (both 
including and excluding VAT on the duty) are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Estimates duty rates per unit of alcohol based on UK duty rates from March 2017 
Category Sub-category Current duty rate 
Estimated 
mean 
ABV 
Estimated 
duty rate per 
unit (pence) 
Proportion 
of category 
Weighted 
average duty 
rate per unit 
(pence) 
Beer 
General 
£19.08 per litre of 
ethanol 
N/A 
19.08 98.4% 
19.15 High strength >7.5% 
£24.77 per litre of 
ethanol 
24.77 1.5% 
Lower strength 1.2%-
2.8% 
£8.42 per litre of 
ethanol 
8.42 0.1% 
Cider (and 
perry) 
1.2%-7.5% 
£40.38 per 100 
litres of product 
4.5% 8.97 88.7% 
8.88 
7.5%-8.5% 
£61.04 per 100 
litres of product 
7.5% 8.14 11.3% 
Sparkling 1.2%-5.5% 
£40.38 per 100 
litres of product 
4.5% 8.97 0.0% 
Sparkling 5.5%-8.5% 
£279.46 per 100 
litres of product 
7.5% 37.26 0.0% 
Wine 
1.2%-4% 
£88.93 per 100 
litres of product 
4.0% 22.23 0.0% 
23.75 
4%-5.5% 
£122.30 per 100 
litres of product 
5.5% 22.24 0.4% 
5.5%-15% 
£288.65 per 100 
litres of product 
12.5% 23.15 84.9% 
15%-22% 
£384.82 per 100 
litres of product 
17.0% 22.64 4.7% 
22% above 
£28.74 per litre of 
ethanol 
N/A 28.74 0.0% 
Sparkling 5.5%-8.5% 
£279.46 per 100 
litres of product 
7.0% 39.92 0.0% 
Sparkling 8.5-15% 
£369.72 per 100 
litres of product 
12.5% 29.58 9.9% 
Spirits and spirits-based RTDs 
£28.74 per litre of 
ethanol 
N/A 28.74 100.0% 28.74 
 
                                                             
**
 Pre-mixed drinks often referred to as alcopops 
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For the analysis in this report, we estimate the impact of a flat percentage increase in current 
alcohol duties (i.e. all duty rates are increased by the same relative amount). If we call this 
increase 𝑥% then, for each beverage type 𝑖, we can express the change in price per standard 
drink as: 
𝛿𝑖
∗ = 𝛿𝑖 × 𝑥% × (1 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇) 
Where 𝛿𝑖
∗ is the change in price per standard drink, 𝛿𝑖 is the baseline duty per standard drink 
and VAT is the VAT rate. 
This beverage-specific increase is applied to all transactions in the LCFS. 
As outlined in the data section, SAPM incorporates evidence of the extent to which tax changes 
are passed through to off-trade prices. As illustrated in Figure 2, this shows that, while more 
expensive products are over-shifted (i.e. the price increase is greater than the increase from the 
tax rise alone), cheaper products are under-shifted (i.e. the price increase is smaller than would 
be expected). This gradient is observed across all beverage types, although it is notable that 
beer and spirits see lower rates of passthrough across all price levels compared to wine. 
This evidence is incorporated in SAPM by first sifting through off-trade transaction level prices of 
each beverage type (𝑖) and determining the decile of the price distribution into which the 
transaction price falls. Thereafter, a post duty increase per unit price (𝑝𝑖
∗) is calculated by 
summing the baseline per unit price (𝑝𝑖) of beverage 𝑖 and the product of duty plus VAT per unit 
increase (𝛿𝑖
∗) and corresponding pass-through rate: 
 
𝑝𝑖
∗ =  𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖
∗  × (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
For instance, if the baseline price of beer sold in the off-trade is in the lowest decile of prices per 
unit then a pass-through rate of 0.852 would be applied to any duty increase. 
Following these adjustments the revised dataset is used to estimate changes in prices paid in 
the same way as when modelling MUP policies – see the 2014 report for details. 
The final new aspect of this analysis is the use of ‘equivalisation’, the process whereby the duty 
increase is identified which corresponds to the same impact on a specific outcome measure of 
interest as a specific index policy (in this case a 50p MUP). In order to calculate the equivalised 
duty increase for any measure, SAPM is run iteratively across a range of duty increases, until 
the duty level is identified which produces the equivalent outcome value as the index policy, 
within a margin of error of <0.5%. This approach has previously been used in both England 3 
and Scotland 10. 
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Results 
Baseline alcohol consumption and purchasing 
Table 5 illustrates that there are just under 2million adults in Wales who drink alcohol, each 
consuming an average of 610 units and spending £607 per year. Almost three quarters of these 
drinkers consume within the UK Chief Medical Officer’s drinking guidelines of 14 units/week, 
however 24% of drinkers are drinking at potentially hazardous levels (14-50 units/week for men 
and 14-35 for women), and over 4% are harmful drinkers (over 50 units/week for men and 35 for 
women). The average harmful drinker consumes 3,924 units a year, equivalent to around 30 
pints of beer, or 8 bottles of wine a week, and spends almost £3,000 per year on alcohol. 
Table 5: Baseline drinker characteristics by drinker type 
 
All drinkers Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 1,910,072 1,379,341 449,339 81,392 
% of all drinkers 100.00% 72.21% 23.52% 4.26% 
Baseline consumption per 
drinker per year (units) 
610 211 1,236 3,924 
Baseline spending per 
drinker per year 
£607 £276 £1,209 £2,882 
 
Equivalent figures showing variation in drinking across quintiles of deprivation are presented in 
Table 6. These show that people in more deprived areas are more likely to abstain from drinking 
entirely, with almost 27% of those in the most deprived quintile, compared to 14% in the least 
deprived, being non-drinkers. Among those who do drink, those in more deprived areas drink 
less on average (546 units per year compared to 648 in the least deprived quintile) and spend 
considerably less (£441 per year vs. £780 per year). 
Table 6: Baseline drinker characteristics by WIMD quintile 
 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 428,613 406,718 406,692 361,987 306,062 
Abstention rate 13.9% 18.9% 19.4% 20.7% 26.7% 
Baseline consumption per 
drinker per year (units) 
648 649 598 589 546 
Baseline spending per 
drinker per year 
£780 £676 £563 £515 £441 
 
A summary of population patterns in drinking, consumption and spending on alcohol is shown in 
Figure 3. This highlights that even though hazardous and harmful drinkers combined account for 
22% of the entire adult population, they drink 75% of, and are responsible for 67% of all 
spending on, all alcohol consumed in Wales. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the population, alcohol consumption and spending by drinker type 
 
As well as differing in the amount that they drink, those in different drinker groups drink different 
products. Moderate drinkers consume a greater proportion of their alcohol as spirits and wine, 
while heavier drinkers drink more cider, as illustrated in Figure 4. These proportional differences 
should be considered alongside the figures from Table 5 – while harmful drinkers consume 8% 
of their alcohol as cider compared to 6% for moderate drinkers, the respective numbers of units 
consumed on average are 326 and 13 per year. Heavier drinkers also drink a greater proportion 
of their alcohol in the off-trade rather than the on-trade (i.e. alcohol purchased from shops and 
supermarkets, rather than in pubs and restaurants), as illustrated in Figure 5, although all 
drinkers consume the majority of their alcohol in the off-trade, on average. 
Figure 4: Beverage preferences by drinker type 
†† 
                                                             
††
 Values below 5% not labelled. 
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Figure 5: Channel preferences by drinker type 
 
There are also substantial differences in the prices that those in different groups pay for their 
alcohol, with heavier drinkers, and those living in more deprived areas, typically paying less for 
each unit they drink. These patterns, shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 are partly due to drinkers 
in these groups consuming more of their alcohol in the off-trade, where prices are typically 
lower, and partly due to these drinkers purchasing cheaper products. On average, moderate 
drinkers pay 60p/unit for off-trade alcohol and £2.36/unit for on-trade alcohol, compared to 56p 
and £1.82 respectively for hazardous drinkers and 48p and £1.55 for harmful drinkers. 
Figure 6: Average prices paid by beverage and drinker type 
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Figure 7: Average prices paid by beverage type and WIMD quintile 
 
In addition to highlighting differences between population groups in prices paid for alcohol, 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 also highlight variation in prices between products. These differences are 
shown further in Table 7 and Figure 8, which present the estimated proportion of alcohol units 
which are sold below a range of price thresholds. A more detailed breakdown, by drink type and 
channel, focussing on 50p only can be found in the interim report. These estimates show that at 
all potential MUP levels, the heavier the drinker, the greater the proportion of their alcohol which 
will be affected by the policy. However, the proportion of moderate drinkers’ consumption which 
is affected also rises as the MUP threshold increases, from 4% at 35p to 22% at 50p and 50% 
at 70p/unit. 
 
Table 7: Proportion of alcohol purchased below a range of price thresholds by drinker type 
  
Price threshold 
35p 40p 45p 50p 55p 60p 65p 70p 
All 
drinkers 7% 15% 27% 37% 50% 56% 63% 66% 
Moderate 4% 9% 16% 22% 34% 40% 47% 50% 
Hazardous 7% 14% 26% 36% 49% 55% 62% 65% 
Harmful 10% 19% 35% 46% 62% 67% 74% 78% 
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Figure 8: Proportion of alcohol purchased for below a range of price thresholds by drinker type 
 
Table 8 presents the breakdown of units sold below a range of price thresholds by drink type 
and channel. This shows that across the modelled range of potential MUP thresholds, prices in 
the on-trade are almost entirely unaffected, however the extent of the impact on off-trade prices 
varies hugely from 9% of all sales (by volume) at 35p/unit up to 85% at 70p. The proportion of 
alcohol sold below different price thresholds also varies widely between beverage types even 
within the off-trade, as illustrated in Figure 9.  
Table 8: Proportion of alcohol sold below a range of price thresholds by drink type and channel 
 
Price threshold 
35p 40p 45p 50p 55p 60p 65p 70p 
Off-trade 
Beer 20% 34% 47% 62% 76% 83% 89% 94% 
Cider 48% 56% 66% 73% 79% 84% 86% 89% 
Wine 4% 8% 22% 32% 55% 64% 75% 81% 
Spirits 2% 19% 43% 60% 74% 79% 85% 88% 
RTDs 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 8% 13% 
On-trade 
Beer 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 
Cider 0% 0% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
Wine 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 5% 
Spirits 2% 2% 4% 5% 8% 9% 9% 11% 
RTDs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
      
      
  
All off-trade 9% 19% 35% 47% 65% 72% 81% 85% 
All on-trade 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 5% 
      
      
  
All alcohol 7% 15% 27% 37% 50% 56% 63% 66% 
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Figure 9: Proportion of off-trade alcohol sold below a range of price thresholds by drink type 
 
 
Baseline alcohol-attributable mortality and hospital admissions 
Overall, SAPM estimates that 777 deaths and 35,637 hospital admissions in Wales are directly 
caused by alcohol.  
Table 9 breaks these down by condition, showing that liver disease is the single largest cause of 
deaths due to alcohol, followed closely by cancer. For hospital admissions the pattern is 
somewhat different, with the largest contributors to the overall burden of alcohol of hospital 
admissions being through hypertension and conditions related to alcohol dependence. These 
figures also illustrate that alcohol is estimated to have a protective effect for diabetes, stroke 
and other cardiovascular conditions. These effects are widely disputed in the academic 
literature, which may make estimates of both the burden of harm from alcohol and the 
effectiveness of alcohol policies as modelled by SAPM, which includes these effects, 
conservative. Figure 10 shows these patterns visually, excluding protective conditions for ease 
of interpretation. 
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Table 9: Estimated annual deaths and hospital admissions caused by alcohol by condition 
 Annual alcohol-
attributable deaths 
Annual alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions 
Liver disease 369 4,288 
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of 
alcohol 
29 9,307 
Alcohol poisoning 22 1,736 
Other wholly alcohol-attributable conditions 8 701 
Cancers 342 2,169 
Hypertension 22 13,345 
Stroke -27 -227 
Other cardiovascular conditions -215 595 
Diabetes (type II) -26 -2,575 
Other chronic conditions 86 2,484 
Road traffic accidents 29 533 
Falls 47 1,689 
Other injuries 92 1,593 
   
Total 777 35,637 
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Figure 10: Proportional causes of alcohol-attributable death and hospital admission (excluding protective conditions) 
 
 
Estimates of the variation in the burden of alcohol on health by drinker group are presented in 
Table 10. As with all harm outcomes, we present both the absolute numbers and the rates. The 
former are most appropriate when considering the absolute burden of alcohol, or impact of 
policy on this burden, while the latter is more appropriate when comparing between groups (as 
these groups are often of very different sizes). These estimates show a very substantial gradient 
in harm, with hazardous and harmful drinkers suffering a substantial burden of harm as a result 
of their drinking – e.g. an estimated 685 deaths and 15,421 hospital admissions each year for 
every 100,000 harmful drinkers. 
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Table 10: Estimated annual deaths and hospital admissions caused by alcohol by drinker type 
 
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline alcohol-attributable deaths 
per year 
777 -77 297 557 
Baseline alcohol-attributable deaths 
per 100,000 drinkers per year 
41 -6 66 685 
      
 
  
Baseline alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions per year 
35,637 5,735 17,350 12,552 
Baseline alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions per 100,000 
drinkers per year 
1,866 416 3,861 15,421 
 
Table 11 shows that there is also a significant deprivation gradient in harm. In spite of the fact 
that drinkers in most deprived groups drink less on average, this group experiences almost 3 
times as many deaths and twice as many hospital admissions per drinker than those in the least 
deprived group. This phenomenon is widely referred to as the ‘Alcohol Harm Paradox’ 34–37. 
Table 11: Estimated annual deaths and hospital admissions caused by alcohol by WIMD quintile 
 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths per year 
120 123 141 165 228 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths per 
100,000 drinkers per year 
28 30 35 45 75 
            
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per year 
5,956 6,270 7,082 7,689 8,639 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per 100,000 
drinkers per year 
1,390 1,542 1,741 2,124 2,823 
 
Figure 11 shows the combined gradient in alcohol-attributable deaths across both deprivation 
and drinker groups. This highlights that the negative impacts of alcohol on health are 
disproportionately concentrated in heavier drinkers in the lowest socioeconomic groups. The 
underlying figures are shown in Table 48 in the Appendix.  
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Figure 11: Estimated annual deaths caused by alcohol by drinker group and WIMD quintile 
 
 
Finally, Table 12 illustrates that 2.9% of all deaths among adults in Wales in 2016 are estimated 
to have been caused directly by alcohol. This proportion is higher in men than in women (3.8% 
vs. 1.9%) and substantially higher in the most compared to the least deprived areas (5.0% vs, 
2.2%).   
Table 12: Contribution of alcohol to overall mortality by gender and deprivation 
 
Proportion of all deaths 
which are attributable to 
alcohol 
Population 2.9% 
Men 3.8% 
Women 1.9% 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 
2.2% 
WIMD Q2 2.1% 
WIMD Q3 2.5% 
WIMD Q4 3.2% 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 
5.0% 
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Baseline alcohol-attributable crime 
Analysis from SAPM estimates that there are 88,908 alcohol-attributable crimes committed each 
year in Wales, with the vast majority of these being for criminal damage (56%) and violent 
offences (28%). These results are shown in Table 13 further broken down by drinker group, 
illustrating that the greatest number of offences are committed by hazardous drinkers, but that 
the rate of offending is highest among harmful drinkers. No breakdown by WIMD is presented, 
as crime data was not available by WIMD. 
Table 13: Estimated baseline alcohol-attributable crime volumes 
 
All drinkers Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Violent crimes 24,543 10,641 11,559 2,343 
Criminal damage 50,193 21,669 23,906 4,618 
Theft 6,135 2,599 2,942 595 
Sexual offences 8,036 3,148 4,033 855 
    
  
  
Total 88,908 38,057 42,440 8,411 
    
  
  
Rate per 100,000 
drinkers 
4,655 2,759 9,445 10,334 
 
Baseline alcohol-attributable workplace absence 
Our analysis finds that just over half a million days’ work are estimated to be lost in Wales to 
alcohol every year. This is presented in Table 14, which also shows that, as for crime, the 
largest absolute volumes of absence are in hazardous drinkers, while the rate of alcohol-
attributable absence is highest in harmful drinkers. 
Table 14: Estimated baseline alcohol-attributable workplace absence 
 
All 
drinkers Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Days absence 507,795 212,963 227,856 66,975 
 
  
  
  
Rate per 100,000 
drinkers 
26,585 15,440 50,709 82,287 
 
Baseline costs of alcohol 
Finally, Table 15 illustrates the estimated costs of alcohol to society. Each year SAPM estimates 
that alcohol costs the NHS £159m in Wales, while reducing the number of Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYS) by 6,022. We calculate the estimated notional financial value of this 
improvement in population health using the Department of Health’s figure of £60,000 per QALY 
38. Alcohol is estimated to cost Welsh society £509m through police and criminal justice costs 
and the impact on victims of crime, and £45m through reduced workplace productivity due to 
absence. 
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Table 15: Estimated baseline costs of alcohol to society in Wales 
Direct healthcare costs £158,811,082 
Annual QALY loss 6,022 
Estimated QALY 
valuation £361,323,595 
Estimated crime costs £508,980,525 
Estimated workplace 
costs £45,420,203 
 
Appraisal of the potential impact of a range of MUP thresholds 
For a detailed appraisal of the potential impact of a 50p MUP, please see the recently published 
interim report 15. This report presents a broader comparison of the impact of a range of MUP 
thresholds from 35p to 70p per unit. 
Estimated impact of MUP on alcohol consumption 
The modelled impact of each MUP threshold on mean consumption for the population and by 
drinker group is shown in Table 16 and Figure 12. This shows that higher MUP thresholds lead 
to greater overall reductions in consumption and that the greatest increases in effect with each 
increase in the threshold occur in the heaviest drinkers. However, they also highlight that higher 
MUP levels have an increasing impact on moderate drinkers.   
Table 16: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol consumption by drinker group 
  
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 1,910,072 1,379,341 449,339 81,392 
Baseline consumption per drinker per 
year 
610 211 1,236 3,924 
      
 
  
Absolute change (units per 
drinker per year) 
35p MUP -4.9 -0.4 -6.6 -71.9 
40p MUP -9.4 -0.8 -13.9 -128.6 
45p MUP -14.9 -1.4 -24.0 -193.1 
50p MUP -22.0 -2.4 -37.4 -268.7 
55p MUP -30.3 -4.0 -55.0 -339.3 
60p MUP -40.7 -6.2 -77.7 -419.5 
65p MUP -52.5 -9.0 -103.9 -505.3 
70p MUP -65.4 -12.3 -131.7 -599.2 
      
 
  
Relative change 
35p MUP -0.8% -0.2% -0.5% -1.8% 
40p MUP -1.5% -0.4% -1.1% -3.3% 
45p MUP -2.4% -0.7% -1.9% -4.9% 
50p MUP -3.6% -1.1% -3.0% -6.8% 
55p MUP -5.0% -1.9% -4.4% -8.6% 
60p MUP -6.7% -3.0% -6.3% -10.7% 
65p MUP -8.6% -4.3% -8.4% -12.9% 
70p MUP -10.7% -5.8% -10.7% -15.3% 
 
 38 
Figure 12: Modelled effects of MUP policies on consumption by drinker group 
 
 
Equivalent estimates, broken down by WIMD quintile are shown in Table 17 and Figure 13. 
These show a similar pattern, with effects increasing most quickly in more deprived groups as 
the MUP threshold rises. 
Table 17: Estimated impact of MUP policies on mean consumption by deprivation 
  
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 428,613 406,718 406,692 361,987 306,062 
Baseline consumption per drinker 
per year 
648 649 598 589 546 
    
   
  
Absolute change 
(units per drinker per 
year) 
35p MUP -0.2 -1.7 -2.8 -4.2 -19.4 
40p MUP -0.6 -3.7 -6.4 -9.1 -33.2 
45p MUP -1.0 -6.3 -11.4 -15.5 -49.7 
50p MUP -1.9 -9.9 -18.4 -23.9 -68.7 
55p MUP -3.6 -15.3 -27.8 -35.2 -85.1 
60p MUP -6.9 -22.7 -39.7 -48.1 -104.2 
65p MUP -11.3 -31.7 -53.2 -63.0 -124.5 
70p MUP -16.8 -42.0 -68.0 -79.3 -144.5 
    
   
  
Relative change 
35p MUP 0.0% -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% -3.6% 
40p MUP -0.1% -0.6% -1.1% -1.5% -6.1% 
45p MUP -0.2% -1.0% -1.9% -2.6% -9.1% 
50p MUP -0.3% -1.5% -3.1% -4.1% -12.6% 
55p MUP -0.6% -2.4% -4.7% -6.0% -15.6% 
60p MUP -1.1% -3.5% -6.7% -8.2% -19.1% 
65p MUP -1.7% -4.9% -8.9% -10.7% -22.8% 
70p MUP -2.6% -6.5% -11.4% -13.5% -26.5% 
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Figure 13: Modelled effects of MUP policies on consumption by deprivation 
 
 
A detailed breakdown of results by both drinker group and deprivation can be found in Table 49 
in the Appendix.  
Finally, Figure 14 and Figure 15 illustrate the extent to which the impact of each MUP policy is 
accounted for by different drinker and WIMD groups in the population, alongside the proportion 
of the total drinker population in each group. Table 18 shows these results for selected groups 
while full results also broken down by drinker group and WIMD are in Table 50 in the Appendix. 
These results clearly show that as the MUP level increases, the extent to which consumption 
effects are concentrated in the heaviest drinking and most deprived groups falls significantly.  
Figure 14: Distribution of reductions in consumption under MUP policies across drinker groups 
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Figure 15: Distribution of reductions in consumption under MUP policies across WIMD quintiles 
‡‡ 
Table 18: Estimated proportion of MUP policy impacts on consumption accounted for by selected groups 
  
Proportion of change in consumption accounted for by: 
Harmful drinkers 
Drinkers from the 
most deprived WIMD 
quintile 
Harmful drinkers from the 
most deprived WIMD 
quintile 
35p MUP 62.3% 63.2% 45.6% 
40p MUP 58.6% 56.9% 39.8% 
45p MUP 55.3% 53.5% 36.2% 
50p MUP 52.1% 50.1% 32.6% 
55p MUP 47.7% 45.0% 27.1% 
60p MUP 44.0% 41.0% 23.0% 
65p MUP 41.0% 38.0% 20.0% 
70p MUP 39.1% 35.4% 18.0% 
 
Estimated impact of MUP on spending on alcohol 
Modelled estimates of the impact of a range of MUP policies on consumer spending on alcohol 
are presented broken down by drinker group in Table 19 and Figure 16 and by deprivation in 
Table 20 and Figure 17. Results broken down by both drinker group and deprivation are in 
Table 51 in the Appendix. For drinker groups, these results show a similar pattern to 
consumption, with larger effects in harmful drinkers and larger increases in effects in this group 
as the MUP threshold rises. For deprivation, however, the pattern is different, with smaller 
impacts on spending on more deprived groups, and larger changes in these impacts in the least 
deprived groups as the MUP level increases. Indeed, there is little difference in the estimated 
impact on the spending of drinkers in the most deprived quintile between a 45p and 65p MUP 
level.  
                                                             
‡‡
 Values below 5% are not labelled. 
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Table 19: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker group 
  
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 1,910,072 1,379,341 449,339 81,392 
Baseline spending per drinker per year £607 £276 £1,209 £2,882 
      
 
  
Absolute change in annual 
spending per drinker 
35p MUP £1 £0 £1 £6 
40p MUP £1 £1 £3 £10 
45p MUP £4 £2 £8 £24 
50p MUP £8 £3 £18 £48 
55p MUP £14 £5 £30 £88 
60p MUP £21 £7 £43 £130 
65p MUP £27 £10 £56 £174 
70p MUP £33 £12 £67 £211 
      
 
  
Relative change 
35p MUP 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
40p MUP 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 
45p MUP 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 
50p MUP 1.4% 1.1% 1.5% 1.7% 
55p MUP 2.4% 1.8% 2.5% 3.0% 
60p MUP 3.5% 2.6% 3.6% 4.5% 
65p MUP 4.5% 3.5% 4.6% 6.0% 
70p MUP 5.5% 4.3% 5.5% 7.3% 
 
Figure 16: Modelled effects of MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker group 
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Table 20: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumer spending by deprivation 
  
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 428,613 406,718 406,692 361,987 306,062 
Baseline spending per drinker 
per year 
£780 £676 £563 £515 £441 
    
   
  
Absolute change in 
annual spending 
per drinker 
35p MUP £2 £1 £1 £1 -£2 
40p MUP £3 £3 £2 £1 -£4 
45p MUP £7 £7 £5 £4 -£6 
50p MUP £13 £13 £10 £9 -£7 
55p MUP £21 £21 £16 £14 -£6 
60p MUP £31 £30 £22 £20 -£6 
65p MUP £42 £40 £28 £25 -£7 
70p MUP £54 £49 £34 £28 -£10 
    
   
  
Relative change 
35p MUP 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% -0.5% 
40p MUP 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% -0.9% 
45p MUP 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% -1.3% 
50p MUP 1.7% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% -1.5% 
55p MUP 2.7% 3.1% 2.8% 2.7% -1.3% 
60p MUP 4.0% 4.4% 4.0% 3.8% -1.3% 
65p MUP 5.4% 5.8% 5.1% 4.8% -1.7% 
70p MUP 6.9% 7.2% 6.0% 5.5% -2.2% 
 
Figure 17: Modelled effects of MUP policies on consumer spending by deprivation 
 
 
-£20
-£10
£0
£10
£20
£30
£40
£50
£60
WIMD Q1
(least
deprived)
WIMD Q2 WIMD Q3 WIMD Q4 WIMD Q5
(most
deprived)
C
h
an
ge
 in
 a
n
n
u
al
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
p
er
 d
ri
n
ke
r 
35p MUP
40p MUP
45p MUP
50p MUP
55p MUP
60p MUP
65p MUP
70p MUP
 43 
Estimated impact of MUP on retailer and exchequer revenue 
Modelled estimates of the impact across the range of MUP thresholds on annual revenue to the 
exchequer through taxation and to retailers through sales, after accounting for duty and VAT, 
are shown in Table 21, Figure 18 and Figure 19. These show that all MUP policies are 
estimated to reduce the total tax take from alcohol duties, with these losses increasing more 
quickly at MUP levels above 55p/unit. For all MUP levels modelled, exchequer revenues from 
the off-trade are expected to fall, while revenues from the on-trade actually increase at MUP 
levels above 50p/unit, as individuals switch their consumption to the on-trade. 
All MUP policies are estimated to increase revenue to retailers, particularly in the off-trade. This 
is as the increase in prices under MUP more than compensates for the loss in sales volumes as 
consumers buy less alcohol. For MUP levels below 50p, there is estimated to be a small fall in 
revenue in the on-trade (e.g. £800,000/year for a 40p MUP), but from 50p upwards, revenue in 
the on-trade increases modestly due to the switching behaviour discussed above. 
Table 21: Estimated impact of MUP policies on exchequer and retailer revenues 
 
Exchequer Retailers 
Off-
trade 
On-
trade 
Total 
Off-
trade 
On-
trade 
Total 
Baseline receipts (£m) £262 £221 £483 £171 £506 £676 
    
 
    
 
  
Absolute 
change in 
annual 
revenue 
(£m) 
35p MUP -£0.1 -£0.5 -£0.6 £2.5 -£0.8 £1.7 
40p MUP -£0.7 -£0.6 -£1.2 £4.9 -£0.8 £4.1 
45p MUP -£1.2 -£0.4 -£1.6 £9.6 -£0.2 £9.4 
50p MUP -£1.8 £0.0 -£1.9 £16.8 £1.0 £17.8 
55p MUP -£2.6 £0.5 -£2.1 £27.1 £2.5 £29.7 
60p MUP -£3.9 £0.9 -£3.0 £39.1 £3.9 £43.1 
65p MUP -£5.8 £1.3 -£4.5 £51.6 £5.4 £57.0 
70p MUP -£8.5 £1.6 -£6.8 £64.0 £6.7 £70.7 
    
 
    
 
  
Relative 
change 
35p MUP 0.0% -0.2% -0.1% 1.5% -0.2% 0.3% 
40p MUP -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 2.9% -0.2% 0.6% 
45p MUP -0.5% -0.2% -0.3% 5.6% 0.0% 1.4% 
50p MUP -0.7% 0.0% -0.4% 9.9% 0.2% 2.6% 
55p MUP -1.0% 0.2% -0.4% 15.9% 0.5% 4.4% 
60p MUP -1.5% 0.4% -0.6% 22.9% 0.8% 6.4% 
65p MUP -2.2% 0.6% -0.9% 30.3% 1.1% 8.4% 
70p MUP -3.2% 0.7% -1.4% 37.5% 1.3% 10.5% 
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Figure 18: Modelled effects of MUP policies on exchequer revenues 
 
Figure 19: Modelled effects of MUP policies on retailer revenues 
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effect’ of the policy on health. The distribution of effects over time from the modelled MUP 
policies is illustrated in Table 28 and Table 29. 
The pattern of these results is extremely similar to the effects on consumption, with the greatest 
proportion of the alcohol-attributable deaths averted being in heavier drinkers and those in the 
most deprived groups and with these groups seeing the fastest absolute increases in benefits 
as the MUP level increases. However, Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the proportion of deaths 
averted which accrue in each drinker and deprivation group. Table 24 shows these figures for 
selected groups, with full results available in Table 53 in the Appendix. These results show that, 
as for consumption, the higher the MUP threshold, the less ‘targeted’ the policy is at these 
groups. 
Table 22: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable mortality by drinker group 
 
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable deaths 
per year 
777 -77 297 557 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable deaths 
per 100,000 drinkers 
41 -6 66 685 
    
  
  
Absolute change in deaths per 
year 
35p MUP -16 0 -4 -12 
40p MUP -29 0 -8 -21 
45p MUP -45 0 -13 -32 
50p MUP -66 0 -20 -46 
55p MUP -87 -1 -29 -58 
60p MUP -113 -1 -40 -72 
65p MUP -141 -2 -52 -87 
70p MUP -170 -4 -64 -103 
            
Absolute change in deaths per 
100,000 drinkers per year 
35p MUP -1 0 -1 -15 
40p MUP -2 0 -2 -25 
45p MUP -2 0 -3 -39 
50p MUP -3 0 -4 -56 
55p MUP -5 0 -6 -71 
60p MUP -6 0 -9 -88 
65p MUP -7 0 -12 -107 
70p MUP -9 0 -14 -127 
    
  
  
Relative change 
35p MUP -2.0% -0.1% -1.3% -2.1% 
40p MUP -3.7% -0.2% -2.7% -3.7% 
45p MUP -5.8% -0.1% -4.5% -5.7% 
50p MUP -8.5% 0.0% -6.8% -8.2% 
55p MUP -11.2% 0.7%
§§
 -9.6% -10.3% 
60p MUP -14.5% 1.8%
** 
-13.3% -12.8% 
65p MUP -18.2% 3.2%
** 
-17.4% -15.6% 
70p MUP -21.9% 4.7%
** 
-21.5% -18.5% 
 
                                                             
§§ As the baseline number of alcohol-attributable deaths in this group is negative (i.e. alcohol is estimated 
to be overall protective for moderate drinkers), a reduction in the number of deaths following the 
introduction of an MUP policy appears as a positive, rather than a negative relative change. 
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Figure 20: Modelled effects of MUP policies on mortality by drinker group 
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Table 23: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable mortality by deprivation 
 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline annual alcohol-
attributable deaths  
120 123 141 165 228 
Baseline annual alcohol-
attributable deaths per 100,000 
drinkers 
28 30 35 45 75 
            
Absolute change in 
deaths per year 
35p MUP 0 -1 -1 -2 -11 
40p MUP 0 -1 -4 -5 -18 
45p MUP 0 -2 -7 -9 -27 
50p MUP 0 -4 -11 -13 -38 
55p MUP -1 -6 -16 -19 -45 
60p MUP -2 -9 -23 -25 -53 
65p MUP -4 -12 -30 -33 -63 
70p MUP -5 -16 -37 -40 -72 
              
Absolute change in 
deaths per 100,000 
drinkers per year 
35p MUP 0 0 0 -1 -4 
40p MUP 0 0 -1 -1 -6 
45p MUP 0 -1 -2 -2 -9 
50p MUP 0 -1 -3 -4 -12 
55p MUP 0 -1 -4 -5 -15 
60p MUP 0 -2 -6 -7 -17 
65p MUP -1 -3 -7 -9 -20 
70p MUP -1 -4 -9 -11 -23 
    
   
  
Relative change 
35p MUP -0.1% -0.6% -1.0% -1.4% -4.9% 
40p MUP -0.2% -1.2% -2.5% -3.1% -8.1% 
45p MUP -0.2% -1.9% -4.7% -5.3% -11.8% 
50p MUP -0.3% -3.1% -7.7% -8.0% -16.5% 
55p MUP -0.8% -4.8% -11.5% -11.4% -19.7% 
60p MUP -1.7% -7.1% -16.3% -15.4% -23.4% 
65p MUP -2.9% -9.9% -21.3% -20.0% -27.5% 
70p MUP -4.4% -13.2% -26.3% -24.5% -31.4% 
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Figure 21: Modelled effects of MUP policies on mortality by deprivation 
 
 
Figure 22: Distribution of reductions in alcohol-attributable deaths under MUP policies across drinker groups 
*** 
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Figure 23: Distribution of reductions in alcohol-attributable deaths under MUP policies across WIMD quintiles 
††† 
Table 24: Estimated proportion of MUP policy impacts on mortality accounted for by selected groups 
  
Proportion of reduction in alcohol-attributable deaths accounted for by: 
Harmful drinkers 
Drinkers from the most 
deprived WIMD quintile 
Harmful drinkers from the 
most deprived WIMD 
quintile 
35p MUP 75.6% 71.2% 58.9% 
40p MUP 72.3% 64.1% 51.5% 
45p MUP 70.4% 60.0% 47.4% 
50p MUP 69.4% 57.2% 45.0% 
55p MUP 66.4% 51.8% 39.0% 
60p MUP 63.6% 47.5% 34.5% 
65p MUP 61.6% 44.4% 31.5% 
70p MUP 60.5% 42.0% 29.6% 
 
Equivalent results for alcohol-attributable hospital admissions are presented in Table 25, Figure 
24, Table 26, Figure 25 and Table 27, with full results broken down by both drinker group and 
deprivation again found in the Appendix, in Table 54. The pattern of results is generally similar 
to that for alcohol-attributable mortality, however in general the impact on admissions is less 
concentrated in heavier drinker and more deprived groups. This is in large part due to the fact 
that a smaller proportion of alcohol-attributable hospital admissions compared to alcohol-
attributable deaths are caused by health conditions whose prevalence is more strongly 
associated with heavy drinking and greater levels of deprivation, as suggested by Figure 10. 
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Table 25: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable admissions by drinker group 
  
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable 
admissions 
35,637 5,735 17,350 12,552 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable 
admissions per 100,000 drinkers 
1,866 416 3,861 15,421 
    
  
  
Absolute change in admissions 
per year 
35p MUP -262 -24 -108 -129 
40p MUP -517 -46 -226 -245 
45p MUP -857 -79 -383 -396 
50p MUP -1,281 -131 -590 -560 
55p MUP -1,807 -216 -858 -733 
60p MUP -2,476 -333 -1,208 -935 
65p MUP -3,266 -474 -1,602 -1,190 
70p MUP -4,075 -629 -2,002 -1,444 
      
  
  
Absolute change in admissions 
per 100,000 drinkers per year 
35p MUP -14 -2 -24 -159 
40p MUP -27 -3 -50 -301 
45p MUP -45 -6 -85 -486 
50p MUP -67 -10 -131 -688 
55p MUP -95 -16 -191 -901 
60p MUP -130 -24 -269 -1,149 
65p MUP -171 -34 -357 -1,462 
70p MUP -213 -46 -445 -1,774 
      
 
  
Relative change 
35p MUP -0.7% -0.4% -0.6% -1.0% 
40p MUP -1.5% -0.8% -1.3% -1.9% 
45p MUP -2.4% -1.4% -2.2% -3.2% 
50p MUP -3.6% -2.3% -3.4% -4.5% 
55p MUP -5.1% -3.8% -4.9% -5.8% 
60p MUP -6.9% -5.8% -7.0% -7.5% 
65p MUP -9.2% -8.3% -9.2% -9.5% 
70p MUP -11.4% -11.0% -11.5% -11.5% 
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Figure 24: Modelled effects of MUP policies on admissions by drinker group 
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Table 26: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable admissions by deprivation 
  
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline annual alcohol-
attributable admissions 
5956 6270 7082 7689 8639 
Baseline annual alcohol-
attributable admissions per 
100,000 drinkers 
1,390 1,542 1,741 2,124 2,823 
            
Absolute change in 
admissions per 
year 
35p MUP 2 -11 -31 -57 -165 
40p MUP 1 -28 -82 -123 -284 
45p MUP -4 -47 -151 -219 -437 
50p MUP -8 -80 -233 -338 -622 
55p MUP -22 -135 -350 -487 -812 
60p MUP -49 -209 -502 -676 -1,040 
65p MUP -93 -302 -679 -896 -1,298 
70p MUP -147 -410 -874 -1,105 -1,539 
      
   
  
Absolute change in 
admissions per 
100,000 drinkers 
per year 
35p MUP 0 -3 -8 -16 -54 
40p MUP 0 -7 -20 -34 -93 
45p MUP -1 -11 -37 -60 -143 
50p MUP -2 -20 -57 -93 -203 
55p MUP -5 -33 -86 -135 -265 
60p MUP -12 -51 -123 -187 -340 
65p MUP -22 -74 -167 -247 -424 
70p MUP -34 -101 -215 -305 -503 
    
   
  
Relative change 
35p MUP 0.0% -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -1.9% 
40p MUP 0.0% -0.5% -1.2% -1.6% -3.3% 
45p MUP -0.1% -0.7% -2.1% -2.8% -5.1% 
50p MUP -0.1% -1.3% -3.3% -4.4% -7.2% 
55p MUP -0.4% -2.2% -4.9% -6.3% -9.4% 
60p MUP -0.8% -3.3% -7.1% -8.8% -12.0% 
65p MUP -1.6% -4.8% -9.6% -11.6% -15.0% 
70p MUP -2.5% -6.5% -12.3% -14.4% -17.8% 
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Figure 25: Modelled effects of MUP policies on admissions by deprivation 
 
 
Table 27: Proportion MUP impacts on alcohol-attributable admissions accounted for by selected groups 
  
Proportion of reduction in alcohol-attributable admissions accounted 
for by: 
Harmful drinkers 
Drinkers from the 
most deprived 
WIMD quintile 
Harmful drinkers from 
the most deprived WIMD 
quintile 
35p MUP 49.5% 63.1% 36.8% 
40p MUP 47.4% 54.9% 29.7% 
45p MUP 46.2% 51.0% 26.3% 
50p MUP 43.7% 48.6% 23.8% 
55p MUP 40.6% 44.9% 19.8% 
60p MUP 37.8% 42.0% 16.8% 
65p MUP 36.4% 39.7% 15.0% 
70p MUP 35.4% 37.8% 13.9% 
 
Finally, Table 28 shows the ‘partial effects’ of each MUP policy on alcohol-attributable deaths 
and hospital admissions. These reflect the lags between changes in consumption and changes 
in risk.  Table 29 shows the estimated cumulative number of deaths and admissions averted at 
various points following policy implementation. 
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Table 28: Estimated 'partial effects' - impacts of MUP policies on health outcomes in years 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20 
 
Change in alcohol-attributable deaths per 
year 
Change in alcohol-attributable hospital 
admissions per year 
Year 1 Year 5 
Year 
10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 
Year 
20
‡‡‡
 
35p MUP -8 -14 -14 -15 -16 -193 -308 -321 -296 -262 
40p MUP -14 -25 -26 -28 -29 -366 -585 -618 -576 -517 
45p MUP -22 -38 -39 -44 -45 -591 -946 -1,010 -948 -857 
50p MUP -31 -53 -56 -63 -66 -876 -1,391 -1,491 -1,408 -1,281 
55p MUP -41 -69 -73 -83 -87 -1,211 -1,906 -2,063 -1,964 -1,807 
60p MUP -52 -88 -94 -107 -113 -1,628 -2,550 -2,780 -2,668 -2,476 
65p MUP -65 -108 -116 -133 -141 -2,108 -3,300 -3,621 -3,496 -3,266 
70p MUP -78 -129 -139 -160 -170 -2,601 -4,064 -4,478 -4,341 -4,075 
 
Table 29: Estimated cumulative impacts of MUP policies on health outcomes following implementation 
 
Cumulative change in alcohol-attributable 
deaths since policy implementation 
Cumulative change in alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions since policy 
implementation 
Year 1 Year 5 
Year 
10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 
35p MUP -8 -57 -128 -203 -282 -193 -1,310 -2,911 -4,448 -5,824 
40p MUP -14 -103 -231 -367 -510 -366 -2,482 -5,553 -8,536 -11,236 
45p MUP -22 -158 -354 -566 -788 -591 -4,004 -9,000 -13,892 -18,358 
50p MUP -31 -224 -504 -809 -1,134 -876 -5,895 -13,254 -20,500 -27,157 
55p MUP -41 -289 -653 -1,051 -1,478 -1,211 -8,088 -18,229 -28,303 -37,653 
60p MUP -52 -368 -831 -1,343 -1,895 -1,628 -10,826 -24,452 -38,091 -50,857 
65p MUP -65 -454 -1,027 -1,663 -2,354 -2,108 -13,996 -31,697 -49,520 -66,315 
70p MUP -78 -542 -1,225 -1,988 -2,820 -2,601 -17,235 -39,090 -61,181 -82,094 
 
Estimated impact of MUP on crime outcomes 
Results for the modelled impact of the range of MUP policies on alcohol-related crimes are 
presented in Table 30 and Figure 26. As we did not have access to baseline crime data broken 
down by WIMD quintile, results are presented by drinker group only. Although these results 
show that higher MUP thresholds lead to larger reductions in crime, they also show that the 
greatest estimated reductions are in hazardous, not harmful drinkers. Superficially, this may 
appear surprising; however this is a consequence of the fact that crime is associated with acute 
consumption (i.e. intoxication). Although all MUP policies modelled lead to greater reductions in 
mean consumption in harmful drinkers than hazardous drinkers, we model separate 
relationships between changes in mean consumption and changes in acute consumption for 
both groups. These suggest that hazardous drinkers are more sensitive to reducing their peak 
consumption as their mean consumption reduces, compared to harmful drinkers, meaning that 
we estimate the greatest falls in peak consumption, and therefore crime rates, in hazardous 
drinkers. 
                                                             
‡‡‡
 Note that the number of admissions averted per year actually falls between years 10 and 20. This 
reflects the fact that individuals who no longer die of alcohol-related causes are then at risk of developing 
alcohol-related illnesses in the future. 
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Table 30: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable crime by drinker group 
 
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable offences 88,908 38,057 42,440 8,411 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable offences per 
100,000 drinkers 
4,655 2,759 9,445 10,334 
       
  
Absolute change in offences per year 
35p MUP -364 -90 -231 -43 
40p MUP -759 -201 -482 -76 
45p MUP -1,315 -371 -830 -114 
50p MUP -2,093 -657 -1,277 -159 
55p MUP -3,086 -1,073 -1,815 -198 
60p MUP -4,290 -1,603 -2,448 -239 
65p MUP -5,652 -2,223 -3,148 -280 
70p MUP -7,127 -2,925 -3,875 -327 
         
  
Absolute change in offences per 100,000 
drinkers per year 
35p MUP -19 -7 -51 -53 
40p MUP -40 -15 -107 -94 
45p MUP -69 -27 -185 -140 
50p MUP -110 -48 -284 -195 
55p MUP -162 -78 -404 -244 
60p MUP -225 -116 -545 -293 
65p MUP -296 -161 -701 -345 
70p MUP -373 -212 -862 -401 
          
Relative change 
35p MUP -0.4% -0.2% -0.5% -0.5% 
40p MUP -0.9% -0.5% -1.1% -0.9% 
45p MUP -1.5% -1.0% -2.0% -1.4% 
50p MUP -2.4% -1.7% -3.0% -1.9% 
55p MUP -3.5% -2.8% -4.3% -2.4% 
60p MUP -4.8% -4.2% -5.8% -2.8% 
65p MUP -6.4% -5.8% -7.4% -3.3% 
70p MUP -8.0% -7.7% -9.1% -3.9% 
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Figure 26: Modelled effects of MUP policies on crime by drinker group 
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Estimated impact of MUP on workplace outcomes 
Modelled estimates for the impact of the range of MUP policies on workplace absence are 
shown in Table 31 and Figure 27. As with the estimated impact on crime, these are presented 
by drinker group only and show larger reductions among hazardous drinkers. 
Table 31: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable workplace absence by drinker group 
 
All 
drinkers 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable days’ absence 507,795 212,963 227,856 66,975 
Baseline annual alcohol-attributable days’ absence per 
100,000 drinkers 
26,585 15,440 50,709 82,287 
       
  
Absolute change in absence days per year 
35p MUP -1,838 -457 -1,110 -272 
40p MUP -3,737 -911 -2,330 -497 
45p MUP -6,270 -1,519 -3,997 -754 
50p MUP -9,808 -2,621 -6,138 -1,049 
55p MUP -14,476 -4,359 -8,787 -1,331 
60p MUP -20,489 -6,766 -12,076 -1,647 
65p MUP -27,468 -9,738 -15,762 -1,968 
70p MUP -35,086 -13,169 -19,603 -2,315 
         
  
Absolute change in absence days per 
100,000 drinkers per year 
35p MUP -96 -33 -247 -334 
40p MUP -196 -66 -518 -610 
45p MUP -328 -110 -890 -926 
50p MUP -514 -190 -1,366 -1,289 
55p MUP -758 -316 -1,955 -1,635 
60p MUP -1,073 -491 -2,687 -2,024 
65p MUP -1,438 -706 -3,508 -2,418 
70p MUP -1,837 -955 -4,363 -2,844 
       
  
Relative change 
35p MUP -0.4% -0.2% -0.5% -0.4% 
40p MUP -0.7% -0.4% -1.0% -0.7% 
45p MUP -1.2% -0.7% -1.8% -1.1% 
50p MUP -1.9% -1.2% -2.7% -1.6% 
55p MUP -2.9% -2.0% -3.9% -2.0% 
60p MUP -4.0% -3.2% -5.3% -2.5% 
65p MUP -5.4% -4.6% -6.9% -2.9% 
70p MUP -6.9% -6.2% -8.6% -3.5% 
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Figure 27: Modelled effects of MUP policies on workplace absence by drinker group 
  
 
Estimated impact of MUP policies on societal costs 
Finally, the modelled impact of each MUP policy on a range of societal costs is illustrated in 
Table 32 and Figure 28. These show that the valuation of the health improvements arising from 
the policy are the single largest estimated cost benefit to society and rise fastest as the MUP 
threshold increases. In contrast, the impact of the modelled policies on costs associated with 
workplace absence is relatively small and rises slowly as the MUP level is increased. 
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Table 32: Estimated impact of MUP policies on societal costs over 20 years following policy implementation 
  
Direct 
healthcare 
costs 
Valuation 
of QALYs 
gained 
Costs 
of 
crime 
Costs of 
workplace 
absence 
Total
§§§
 
Baseline annual alcohol-
attributable costs over 20 
years, discounted 
£1,992 £6,500 £7,487 £668 £16,647 
      
    
Cumulative 
absolute change 
over 20 years (£m), 
discounted 
35p MUP -£20 -£115 -£34 -£3 -£171 
40p MUP -£38 -£213 -£70 -£5 -£326 
45p MUP -£62 -£336 -£119 -£9 -£526 
50p MUP -£91 -£490 -£188 -£14 -£783 
55p MUP -£127 -£656 -£276 -£21 -£1,079 
60p MUP -£171 -£858 -£382 -£29 -£1,441 
65p MUP -£222 -£1,085 -£502 -£39 -£1,849 
70p MUP -£275 -£1,317 -£632 -£50 -£2,274 
      
    
Relative change 
35p MUP -1.0% -1.8% -0.5% -0.4% -1.0% 
40p MUP -1.9% -3.3% -0.9% -0.8% -2.0% 
45p MUP -3.1% -5.2% -1.6% -1.4% -3.2% 
50p MUP -4.6% -7.5% -2.5% -2.1% -4.7% 
55p MUP -6.4% -10.1% -3.7% -3.1% -6.5% 
60p MUP -8.6% -13.2% -5.1% -4.4% -8.7% 
65p MUP -11.2% -16.7% -6.7% -5.9% -11.1% 
70p MUP -13.8% -20.3% -8.4% -7.5% -13.7% 
  
                                                             
§§§
 Note that a) this figure includes both direct costs and indirect costs accrued across different parts of 
society (the NHS, the broader economy, society as a whole) and b) this figure should not be interpreted 
as representing the full burden (or the full policy impact) of alcohol on society as there are numerous 
impacts which are not included in the modelling (such as harm to others, public nuisance etc.). 
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Figure 28: Modelled effects of MUP policies on societal costs 
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Comparison of MUP policies and taxation 
Equivalisation of taxation rates 
The results presented thus far illustrate the estimated level of impact of a range of MUP policies 
on various outcomes measures. In this section we identify the level of increases in alcohol 
taxation which would be required to achieve the same impacts as an example 50p MUP on: 
1) Annual alcohol consumption of hazardous and harmful drinkers 
2) Annual alcohol consumption of harmful drinkers 
3) Annual alcohol-attributable deaths among hazardous and harmful drinkers 
4) Annual alcohol-attributable deaths among harmful drinkers 
Taxation increases are modelled as flat percentage increases in current rates and include the 
additional VAT component payable on the increased duty. The respective duty rates are 
presented in Table 33. In order to match the impact of a 50p MUP on hazardous and harmful 
drinkers (i.e. all those drinking above the current UK guidelines), a 33.04% rise is required to 
equal the effect on consumption (objective 1) and a 34.06% rise is required to equal the impact 
on alcohol-attributable deaths (objective 3). In order to achieve the equivalent impacts to a 50p 
MUP in harmful drinkers only, larger increases in tax are required: 48.26% to match the impact 
on consumption (objective 2) and 46.56% to match the impact on deaths (objective 4). All of 
these increases are substantially larger than any changes in alcohol taxation in recent history. 
Table 33: Equivalised duty rates 
  
Baselin
e 
Change in outcome 
50p 
MUP 
33.04
% tax 
rise 
34.06
% tax 
rise 
46.56
% tax 
rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Consumption of hazardous and 
harmful drinkers (units per drinker per 
year) 
1,648 73 73 75 105 109 
Consumption of harmful drinkers 
(units per drinker per year) 
3,924 269 178 184 258 269 
Annual alcohol-attributable deaths 
among hazardous and harmful 
drinkers 
854 -66 -64 -66 -91 -95 
Annual alcohol-attributable deaths 
among harmful drinkers 
557 -46 -32 -33 -46 -48 
 
Whilst a 50p MUP policy acts only on the prices of alcohol which is currently sold below 
50p/unit, increases in duty affect the prices of all alcohol, whatever the current price level. In 
particular, as illustrated by Table 8, almost no alcohol sold in the on-trade is affected by a 50p 
MUP, while all on-trade prices would be affected by a 33% or greater increase in alcohol 
taxation. The full extent of these differences in effect is illustrated in Figure 29, which highlights 
that tax increases would have significantly larger impacts on average prices for all beverage 
types except for off-trade cider, compared to a 50p MUP. These variations in the ways in which 
each policy affects prices means that there are marked differences in the way their effects are 
distributed across the population. 
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Figure 29: Change in mean price under MUP and taxation policies by beverage type and channel 
 
Comparative impacts on consumption and spending of MUP and tax 
The modelled impact of a 50p MUP and the four equivalised tax rises on alcohol consumption, 
by drinker type are shown in Table 34. This shows that whilst all three policies reduce 
consumption across the population, a 48.26% increase in taxation has almost five times the 
impact on moderate drinkers as a 50p MUP, while having the same effect on harmful drinkers. 
This is illustrated in Figure 30. 
Table 34: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on consumption by drinker type 
  
Baseline 
consumption 
(units/year) 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
All 
drinkers 610 -22 -25 -26 -36 -37 
Moderate 211 -2 -7 -7 -9 -10 
Hazardous 1236 -37 -54 -56 -77 -80 
Harmful 3924 -269 -178 -184 -258 -269 
    Relative change 
All 
drinkers   -3.6% -4.1% -4.2% -5.9% -6.1% 
Moderate   -1.1% -3.1% -3.2% -4.5% -4.6% 
Hazardous 
 
-3.0% -4.4% -4.5% -6.3% -6.5% 
Harmful   -6.8% -4.5% -4.7% -6.6% -6.8% 
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Figure 30: Comparative impact of MUP and tax on consumption by drinker type 
 
The differential impact of each policy across the socioeconomic spectrum is shown in Table 35 
and Figure 31. These show a clear socioeconomic gradient in effect for both MUP and tax 
policies, with larger reductions in consumption in more deprived groups, although this is much 
more pronounced for MUP. 
Table 35: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on consumption by deprivation 
  
Baseline 
consumption 
(units/year) 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 648 -2 -15 -16 -22 -23 
WIMD Q2 649 -10 -21 -21 -30 -31 
WIMD Q3 598 -18 -27 -27 -38 -40 
WIMD Q4 589 -24 -29 -30 -42 -43 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 546 -69 -37 -39 -54 -56 
  
 
Relative change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived)   -0.3% -2.4% -2.4% -3.4% -3.6% 
WIMD Q2   -1.5% -3.2% -3.3% -4.6% -4.8% 
WIMD Q3   -3.1% -4.4% -4.6% -6.4% -6.7% 
WIMD Q4   -4.1% -4.9% -5.1% -7.0% -7.3% 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived)   -12.6% -6.9% -7.1% -9.8% -10.2% 
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Figure 31: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on consumption by deprivation 
 
Full results by both drinker and deprivation group are in Table 55 in the Appendix. The 
proportion of the total reduction in consumption coming from each drinker-deprivation group 
under an illustrative 50p MUP and 34.06% tax rise is shown in Figure 32, alongside the 
distribution of these groups in the population. This shows that a greater proportion of the impact 
of a Minimum Unit Price is estimated to be felt in harmful drinkers, particularly those in the most 
deprived areas.  
Figure 32: Distribution of reductions in consumption across the population under a 50p MUP and a 34.06% tax rise 
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The impact of each policy on spending, in Table 36 and Figure 33 show clearly that all four 
taxation policies lead to a substantially larger increase in spending for all drinkers compared to 
MUP. Moderate drinkers are estimated to spend £22 more per year under a 48.26% tax rise 
compared to £3 under a 50p MUP, while for harmful drinkers the difference is larger: £303 
compared to £48 each year. 
Table 36: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by drinker type 
  
Baseline 
annual 
spend 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax 
rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax 
rise 
Absolute change 
All 
drinkers £607 £8 £38 £39 £52 £53 
Moderate £276 £3 £16 £16 £22 £22 
Hazardous £1,209 £18 £74 £76 £100 £103 
Harmful £2,882 £48 £218 £224 £294 £303 
    Relative change 
All 
drinkers   1.4% 6.3% 6.4% 8.5% 8.8% 
Moderate   1.1% 5.7% 5.9% 7.8% 8.1% 
Hazardous 
 
1.5% 6.1% 6.3% 8.3% 8.5% 
Harmful   1.7% 7.5% 7.8% 10.2% 10.5% 
 
Figure 33: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by drinker type 
 
Looking across quintiles of deprivation, as shown in Table 37 and Figure 34, we see similar 
differences, with drinkers in all groups seeing much larger increases in annual spending under 
increases in tax than a 50p MUP. Of particular note is the fact that a 50p MUP is estimated to 
reduce spending on alcohol among the most deprived group, while all modelled tax policies 
increase it.  
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Table 37: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by deprivation 
  
Baselin
e 
annual 
spend 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) £780 £13 £50 £52 £69 £72 
WIMD Q2 £676 £13 £46 £47 £63 £65 
WIMD Q3 £563 £10 £36 £37 £49 £51 
WIMD Q4 £515 £9 £31 £32 £41 £43 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) £441 -£7 £21 £22 £28 £28 
    Relative change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived)   1.7% 6.4% 6.6% 8.9% 9.2% 
WIMD Q2 
 
1.9% 6.8% 7.0% 9.3% 9.6% 
WIMD Q3   1.7% 6.5% 6.6% 8.8% 9.0% 
WIMD Q4 
 
1.7% 6.0% 6.1% 8.0% 8.3% 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived)   
-
1.5% 4.8% 4.9% 6.3% 6.4% 
 
Figure 34: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by deprivation 
 
Full results by both drinker type and deprivation are in Table 56 in the Appendix, and illustrated 
for a 50p MUP and 34.06% tax rise in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by drinker type and deprivation 
 
 
Comparative impacts of MUP and taxation policies on exchequer and retailer 
revenue 
As we saw in Table 21, MUP policies are estimated to reduce exchequer receipts whilst 
increasing retailer revenues. Table 38 and Figure 36 present the comparative impact to the 
exchequer of the four equivalised duty policies compared to 50p MUP. These clearly show that, 
as you would expect, tax increases are estimated to raise significant additional revenue for the 
exchequer. These results also emphasise the finding from Figure 29 that MUP policies only 
affect off-trade prices, while taxation policies are also estimated to raise substantial additional 
tax revenue from pubs and restaurants.   
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Table 38: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on annual exchequer revenue 
 
Baseline 
annual 
receipts 
(£m) 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change (£m) 
Off-trade £262 -£1.8 £68.7 £70.7 £94.0 £97.0 
On-trade £221 £0.0 £32.6 £33.6 £45.5 £47.1 
Total £483 -£1.9 £101.3 £104.3 £139.5 £144.1 
  Relative change 
Off-trade -0.7% 26.2% 27.0% 35.9% 37.1% 
On-trade 0.0% 14.7% 15.2% 20.6% 21.3% 
Total -0.4% 21.0% 21.6% 28.9% 29.8% 
 
Figure 36: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on exchequer receipts 
 
In contrast, the picture for retailer revenue presented in Table 39 and Figure 37 show that, while 
MUP is estimated to increase revenue for retailers, taxation policies are estimated to reduce it 
by a similar, or greater extent. Whilst a 50p MUP would increase revenue to off-trade retailers 
by £16.8million per year, a 34.06% duty increase would reduce revenue by £18.5million. In 
terms of impact on on-trade retailer revenues, a 50p MUP is estimated to increase revenues 
modestly by £1million per year, while a 34.06% duty increase would cut them by £11.2million.  
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Table 39: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on annual retailer revenue 
 
Baseline 
annual 
revenue 
(£m) 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change (£m) 
Off-trade £171 £16.8 -£18.0 -£18.5 -£25.4 -£26.3 
On-trade £506 £1.0 -£10.9 -£11.2 -£15.5 -£16.0 
Total £676 £17.8 -£28.8 -£29.7 -£40.8 -£42.3 
  Relative change 
Off-trade 9.9% -10.5% -10.9% -14.9% -15.4% 
On-trade 0.2% -2.2% -2.2% -3.1% -3.2% 
Total 2.6% -4.3% -4.4% -6.0% -6.3% 
 
Figure 37: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on retailer revenue 
 
 
Comparative impacts of MUP and taxation policies on health 
The modelled estimates of the impact of the five policy options on alcohol-attributable mortality 
and hospital admissions, as shown in Table 40-Table 43 and Figure 38-Figure 42, are broadly 
similar to those for consumption. Whilst both MUP and taxation policies lead to the greatest 
reductions in mortality and hospital admissions in the heaviest drinkers, the health benefits of 
MUP are more concentrated in harmful drinkers and those in the most deprived quintiles, while 
the effects of taxation are spread more widely across the population. Full results by both drinker 
group and deprivation are given in Table 57 and Table 58 in the Appendix. 
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Table 40: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on deaths by drinker group 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-attributable 
deaths 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
All drinkers 777 -66 -66 -69 -95 -98 
Moderate -77 0 -3 -3 -4 -4 
Hazardous 297 -20 -32 -33 -45 -47 
Harmful 557 -46 -32 -33 -46 -48 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
All drinkers 41 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 
Moderate -6 0 0 0 0 0 
Hazardous 66 -4 -7 -7 -10 -10 
Harmful 685 -56 -39 -40 -56 -58 
    Relative change 
All drinkers   -8.5% -8.5% -8.8% -12.2% -12.7% 
Moderate   0.0% 3.3% 3.4% 4.8% 5.0% 
Hazardous 
 
-6.8% -10.8% -11.1% -15.3% -15.9% 
Harmful   -8.2% -5.7% -5.9% -8.2% -8.5% 
 
Figure 38: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on mortality by drinker type 
 
 
 
  
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
Moderate Hazardous Harmful
C
h
an
ge
 in
 a
n
n
u
al
 a
lc
o
h
o
l-
at
tr
ib
u
ta
b
le
 
d
ea
th
s 
p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 d
ri
n
ke
rs
 
50p MUP
33.04% tax rise
34.06% tax rise
46.56% tax rise
48.26% tax rise
 71 
Table 41: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation polices on mortality by deprivation 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-
attributable 
deaths per 
100,000 drinkers 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06
% tax 
rise 
46.56
% tax 
rise 
48.26
% tax 
rise 
Absolute change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 120 0 -6 -6 -9 -9 
WIMD Q2 123 -4 -10 -10 -14 -14 
WIMD Q3 141 -11 -15 -16 -22 -23 
WIMD Q4 165 -13 -16 -17 -23 -24 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 228 -38 -19 -20 -27 -28 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 28 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 
WIMD Q2 30 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 
WIMD Q3 35 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 
WIMD Q4 45 -4 -4 -5 -6 -7 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 75 -12 -6 -7 -9 -9 
    Relative change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived)   -0.3% -5.0% -5.2% -7.3% -7.6% 
WIMD Q2   -3.1% -7.7% -8.0% -11.2% -11.6% 
WIMD Q3   -7.7% -10.8% -11.2% -15.6% -16.2% 
WIMD Q4   -8.0% -9.8% -10.1% -14.0% -14.5% 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived)   -16.5% -8.5% -8.8% -12.0% -12.4% 
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Figure 39: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on mortality by deprivation 
 
 
Figure 40: Distribution of reductions in alcohol-attributable deaths across the population under a 50p MUP and a 
34.06% tax rise 
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Table 42: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on hospital admissions by drinker type 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-attributable 
hospital 
admissions 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
All drinkers 35,637 -1,281 -1,689 -1,741 -2,405 -2,498 
Moderate 5,735 -131 -324 -334 -465 -483 
Hazardous 17,350 -590 -889 -918 -1,277 -1,326 
Harmful 12,552 -560 -476 -490 -663 -689 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
All drinkers 1866 -67 -88 -91 -126 -131 
Moderate 416 -10 -23 -24 -34 -35 
Hazardous 3861 -131 -198 -204 -284 -295 
Harmful 15421 -688 -585 -601 -815 -846 
    Relative change 
All drinkers   -3.6% -4.7% -4.9% -6.7% -7.0% 
Moderate   -2.3% -5.6% -5.8% -8.1% -8.4% 
Hazardous 
 
-3.4% -5.1% -5.3% -7.4% -7.6% 
Harmful   -4.5% -3.8% -3.9% -5.3% -5.5% 
 
Figure 41: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on hospital admissions by drinker type 
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Table 43: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on hospital admissions by deprivation 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-
attributable 
admissions  
50p 
MUP 
33.04
% tax 
rise 
34.06
% tax 
rise 
46.56
% tax 
rise 
48.26
% tax 
rise 
Absolute change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 5,956 -8 -160 -165 -232 -241 
WIMD Q2 6,270 -80 -251 -259 -364 -379 
WIMD Q3 7,082 -233 -377 -388 -531 -552 
WIMD Q4 7,689 -338 -434 -448 -617 -640 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 8,639 -622 -467 -481 -661 -686 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 1,390 -2 -37 -39 -54 -56 
WIMD Q2 1,542 -20 -62 -64 -89 -93 
WIMD Q3 1,741 -57 -93 -95 -131 -136 
WIMD Q4 2,124 -93 -120 -124 -170 -177 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 2,823 -203 -153 -157 -216 -224 
    Relative change 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived)   -0.1% -2.7% -2.8% -3.9% -4.0% 
WIMD Q2   -1.3% -4.0% -4.1% -5.8% -6.0% 
WIMD Q3   -3.3% -5.3% -5.5% -7.5% -7.8% 
WIMD Q4   -4.4% -5.6% -5.8% -8.0% -8.3% 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived)   -7.2% -5.4% -5.6% -7.7% -7.9% 
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Figure 42: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on hospital admissions by deprivation 
 
 
Figure 43: Distribution of reductions in alcohol-attributable hospital admissions across the population under a 50p 
MUP and a 34.06% tax rise 
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Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on crime 
Results showing the estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on alcohol-attributable 
crime volumes are shown in Table 44 and Figure 44. These suggest that taxation policies are 
likely to lead to greater reductions in crime among moderate and, particularly for higher duty 
increases, hazardous drinkers, while a 50p MUP leads to a larger reduction in offences 
committed by harmful drinkers. As discussed on page 54, this is due to the fact that we estimate 
moderate and hazardous drinkers are more responsive in terms of changing their drinking 
patterns than harmful drinkers, and that taxation policies have greater effects in moderate and 
hazardous drinkers than MUP. 
Table 44: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on crime 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-
attributable 
crimes 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
All drinkers 88,908 -2093 -2945 -3038 -4195 -4354 
Moderate 38,057 -657 -1514 -1562 -2154 -2235 
Hazardous 42,440 -1277 -1343 -1385 -1914 -1987 
Harmful 8,411 -159 -88 -91 -127 -132 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
All drinkers 4,655 -110 -154 -159 -220 -228 
Moderate 2,759 -48 -110 -113 -156 -162 
Hazardous 9,445 -284 -299 -308 -426 -442 
Harmful 10,334 -195 -108 -112 -156 -162 
    Relative change 
All drinkers   -2.4% -3.3% -3.4% -4.7% -4.9% 
Moderate   -1.7% -4.0% -4.1% -5.7% -5.9% 
Hazardous 
 
-3.0% -3.2% -3.3% -4.5% -4.7% 
Harmful   -1.9% -1.0% -1.1% -1.5% -1.6% 
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Figure 44: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on crime 
 
 
Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on workplace absence 
Finally, Table 45 and Figure 45 present the modelled impact of each policy on alcohol-
attributable absence from work, showing very similar patterns to the estimated impact on crime. 
Overall tax rises are estimated to lead to greater reductions in absence, while a 50p MUP leads 
to the greatest reduction among harmful drinkers. These patterns appear for similar reasons to 
the patterns in crime impacts as discussed above. 
Table 45: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on workplace absence 
  
Baseline annual 
alcohol-
attributable days 
absence 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
Absolute change 
All drinkers 507,795 -9,808 -14,888 -15,368 -21,355 -22,183 
Moderate 212,963 -2,621 -6,988 -7,214 -10,024 -10,412 
Hazardous 227,856 -6,138 -7,315 -7,551 -10,486 -10,892 
Harmful 66,975 -1,049 -584 -603 -845 -879 
  
Per 100,000 
drinkers Absolute change per 100,000 drinkers 
All drinkers 26,585 -514 -779 -805 -1,118 -1,161 
Moderate 15,440 -190 -507 -523 -727 -755 
Hazardous 50,709 -1,366 -1,628 -1,680 -2,334 -2,424 
Harmful 82,287 -1,289 -718 -741 -1,038 -1,079 
    Relative change 
All drinkers   -1.9% -2.9% -3.0% -4.2% -4.4% 
Moderate   -1.2% -3.3% -3.4% -4.7% -4.9% 
Hazardous 
 
-2.7% -3.2% -3.3% -4.6% -4.8% 
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Figure 45: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on workplace absence 
 
Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on health inequalities 
As highlighted in Table 11, there are significant socioeconomic inequalities in alcohol-related 
health, with almost a threefold difference in alcohol-attributable mortality rates between the most 
and least deprived quintiles of the Welsh population. The ‘gap’ between these two groups 
means that there are 46 additional deaths per 100,000 drinkers in the most, compared to least 
deprived quintiles. Table 46 and Figure 46 show the impact of a 50p MUP and the four modelled 
tax policies on this inequality gap. These show that, whilst all modelled policies reduce 
inequality, MUP is estimated to reduce the gap by substantially more than tax increases. This is 
due to the greater concentration of MUP’s effects in more deprived groups. 
Table 46: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on health inequalities 
 
Baseline 
alcohol-
attributabl
e deaths 
per year 
Change following policy implementation 
50p 
MUP 
33.04% 
tax rise 
34.06% 
tax rise 
46.56% 
tax rise 
48.26% 
tax rise 
WIMD Q1 (least 
deprived) 28.1 28.0 26.7 26.6 26.0 25.9 
WIMD Q2 30.3 29.4 27.9 27.9 26.9 26.8 
WIMD Q3 34.6 31.9 30.9 30.7 29.2 29.0 
WIMD Q4 45.5 41.9 41.0 40.9 39.1 38.9 
WIMD Q5 (most 
deprived) 74.5 62.2 68.2 68.0 65.6 65.3 
      
   
  
Inequality 'gap' 46.4 34.2 41.5 41.3 39.6 39.3 
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Figure 46: Comparative impact of MUP and taxation policies on health inequalities 
 
Discussion 
Summary of key findings 
The analyses presented in this report suggest that a MUP of between 35 and 70p is an effective 
approach to reducing alcohol consumption and alcohol-attributable harm. For a 50p MUP 
alcohol consumption is estimated to fall by 3.6% and there would be an estimated 66 fewer 
alcohol-attributable deaths per year and 1,281 fewer alcohol-attributable hospital admissions 
after 20 years when the policy is at full effect.  
The policy is also well targeted, with all modelled MUP policies leading to substantially greater 
reductions in alcohol consumption in harmful drinkers compared to moderate drinkers. The 
largest reductions in consumption would be seen in the most deprived harmful drinkers. This is 
important, as these are the groups at greatest risk of experiencing harm due to their drinking.  In 
contrast, moderate drinkers, including those in the most deprived groups, would be affected to a 
much lesser degree.  These targeted reductions occur because MUP imposes large price 
increases on the lowest cost alcohol, small price increases on alcohol sold close to the relevant 
price threshold and no direct price increase on alcohol sold above this threshold. The highest 
risk drinkers buy large amounts of alcohol at low prices which are likely to be significantly 
affected by MUP and would face large price increases as a result. Lower risk drinkers are less 
likely to buy this cheap alcohol, and what they do buy is likely to be closer to the MUP threshold, 
meaning they would face only modest increases in price when the policy is introduced. 
When looking across the range of modelled MUP thresholds from 35 to 70p, a clear pattern 
emerges. Higher MUP levels lead to greater overall reductions in consumption and reductions in 
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alcohol-related harms; however they are also less targeted, with a greater proportion of the 
alcohol purchased by moderate drinkers being affected and therefore a greater impact on their 
consumption. In other words, the higher the MUP threshold, the greater the impact, but the less 
concentrated these impacts on the groups in the population at the greatest risk of harm. 
Large alcohol tax increases of between 33% and 48% would be required to achieve the same 
reductions in alcohol consumption and alcohol-attributable mortality among heavier drinkers as 
would be achieved by a 50p MUP. These tax increases would be less well targeted on the 
highest risk drinkers, would impact moderate drinkers to a greater degree and would be less 
effective in reducing alcohol-attributable health inequalities.  
These findings are broadly in line with a large body of evidence on the effects of alcohol price 
increases,  40–44 alcohol-related health risks 27 and other modelling and analytical exercises 
which have examined the potential effects of minimum pricing policies in the UK and other 
countries 45–50. Differences between the present findings and previous work tend to arise from 
the use of less detailed data which necessitate more problematic assumptions. A comparison of 
estimates from the Canadian adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model with evaluation 
evidence from Canada suggests that the model is conservative and may be under-estimating 
the impact of minimum unit pricing 13,46.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
The Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model is a world-leading alcohol policy appraisal tool and previous 
analyses have been published in the most prestigious scientific journals 2,3,51,52. It provides the 
most comprehensive analyses available of the potential impact of alcohol policies, spanning a 
wide range of outcomes and permitting analyses of key population subgroups of policy interest. 
An extensive body of sensitivity analyses has demonstrated that our main conclusions on MUP 
are robust to varying the key assumptions, datasets and analytical methods used within the 
model 2,3,8,9,53.   
Important features of the model include: 
 Synthesizing the best available local data with high-quality international evidence; 
 Accounting for detailed patterns of switching between alcoholic products and between 
the on-trade and off-trade following price changes; 
 Accounting for variation across product types and price points in the pass-through of 
alcohol tax increases to prices;  
 Modelling changes in both average weekly consumption and single occasion drinking 
(i.e. binge drinking) and the associated changes in risk for both chronic and acute 
alcohol-attributable harms; 
 Accounting for time lags in changes in alcohol-attributable harm following changes in 
alcohol consumption. 
Strengths of the present modelling relative to our 2014 report on the potential impacts of MUP in 
Wales 1 include the use of alcohol consumption data from the newly available National Survey 
for Wales in place of a smaller sample of Welsh data from the 2008-2011 UK-wide General 
Household Surveys.  The epidemiological evidence used to model alcohol-attributable cancers 
and ischaemic heart disease has also been updated to account for important developments in 
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these areas. Finally, new analyses are included comparing the potential impacts of MUP with 
alcohol tax increases  with the tax increase modelling being selected to achieve equivalent 
effects to a 50p MUP.  
Limitations of all versions of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model include not accounting for 
potential secondary policy effects including increased illicit alcohol trading, cross-border trade or 
restructuring of the alcohol market. Other limitations include the assumption for most health 
conditions that the relationship between consumption and risk are the same for both mortality 
and hospitalisation (although separate evidence is available and used for cardiovascular 
conditions), and the underestimation of alcohol consumption and purchasing by survey data – a 
problem common to all individual-level alcohol research 54. 
Limitations specific to this report include the assumption that purchasing patterns in WIMD 
quintiles are equivalent to purchasing patterns in the same income quintiles (i.e. the most 
deprived WIMD quintile’s purchases are similar to those in the lowest income quintile). As 
WIMD is an area-level measure, while income is a household-level measure, there will be some 
degree of variation between these two groups. However this is mitigated by the fact that 
household income is one of the largest components of the WIMD calculation and that there is 
significant correlation between income and the other domains (unemployment, health, 
education, access to services, community safety, the physical environment and housing) 16. The 
effect of this assumption may be to slightly overstate the between-WIMD quintile differences in 
prices paid (after accounting for differences due to age, sex and the distribution of drinkers). It 
should however be noted that a similar assumption, equating the lowest WIMD quintile with the 
proportion of the population in poverty (as defined in terms of household income) was made in 
the 2014 report. 
Another limitation which is not specific to this report is the lack of available data on any 
deprivation gradient in baseline criminal offending and the resulting assumption that, after 
accounting for age, sex and drinking level, propensity to commit crime is independent of 
deprivation level. In the present report we have used offending data from published police 
sources 29 and demographic data on individuals appearing in court from the Ministry of Justice. 
Neither source contains data on the socioeconomic status of the individuals concerned. Data for 
England and Wales shows that a significantly greater volume of crimes are committed in more 
deprived areas 55 and there is a long history of international literature suggesting offending rates 
are higher among lower socioeconomic groups 56,57. It is therefore likely that offending rates in 
Wales are higher among those living in more deprived areas (in general, although this may not 
necessarily be true for some types of offence). The potential impact of this limitation in the data 
used in the model is therefore likely to be an underestimate overall crime and therefore alcohol-
attributable crime in the most deprived areas and overestimate it in the least deprived areas. As 
a consequence of the fact that all modelled policies affect consumption in more deprived groups 
more than less deprived groups, this also means our analysis may underestimate the true 
impact of pricing policies on alcohol-attributable crime. This is particularly true for MUP policies, 
which have the greatest impact in the most deprived groups. 
Finally, there are similar limitations in the data used in the workplace modelling. This data does 
not include individual-level deprivation and therefore we assume that employment and absence 
rates are the same across all deprivation groups. As unemployment is one of the domains in the 
calculation of WIMD scores, there is inevitably some degree of correlation between 
unemployment and deprivation. For similar reasons to the crime data outlined above, this is 
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likely to lead to an underestimate of the impact of price policies, particularly MUP, on workplace 
absence. As the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from which absence rates are estimated does 
include income, we can look at differential rates of absence by income quintile, as shown in 
Table 47. These suggest that absence rates are higher in lower income groups. Unfortunately, 
the Welsh sample size in this data is insufficient to support stratifying this data by age, sex and 
income; however this is likely to lead our analysis to further underestimate the true impact of 
pricing policies on workplace outcomes.   
Table 47: Annual working days and days absent by income quintile 
Income band 
Average 
working days 
per week 
Overall 
absence rate 
Quintile 1 (lowest) 3.73 2.1% 
Quintile 2 4.53 1.7% 
Quintile 3 4.70 0.6% 
Quintile 4 4.75 1.1% 
Quintile 5 (highest) 4.77 0.6% 
 
Finally, our analysis of workplace outcomes does not account for the complex interrelationship 
between drinking behavior and unemployment. Numerous studies in the UK and internationally 
have shown that this relationship is bi-directional (i.e. that increased drinking may lead to 
unemployment or vice versa); however the nature of this relationship has yet to be fully 
understood 58,59 and it is therefore difficult to be sure of the impact that excluding this 
relationship from our modelling has on the estimates of the impact of pricing policies on the 
broader economy in this report. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 48: Estimated annual deaths and hospital admissions caused by alcohol by drinker group and deprivation quintile 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per year 
-12 -17 -19 -20 -9 52 59 72 61 54 81 82 88 123 184 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per 100,000 
drinkers per year 
-4 -6 -7 -7 -4 46 57 72 77 97 444 444 512 804 1,502 
    
   
    
   
    
   
  
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per 
year 
810 942 1,106 1,304 1,575 3,133 3,321 3,848 3,612 3,437 2,013 2,008 2,129 2,774 3,628 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable hospital 
admissions per 
100,000 drinkers 
per year 
272 329 381 489 661 2,787 3,255 3,879 4,505 6,192 11,042 10,932 12,330 18,127 29,683 
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Table 49: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumption by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD 
Q5 
(most 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 
297,937 
286,32
2 
290,24
8 
266,50
3 
238,332 112,441 
102,03
1 
99,177 
80,18
1 
55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 12,221 
Baseline 
consumption per 
drinker per year 
231 211 213 200 194 1,228 1,245 1,262 1,219 1,216 3,892 4,168 3,244 4,081 4,367 
       
    
   
    
   
  
Absolute 
change 
(units 
per 
drinker 
per year) 
35p MUP 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3 0.5 -3.0 -5.7 -9.8 -24.4 -6.5 -22.1 -30.2 -34.4 -350.2 
40p MUP 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -1.5 -2.5 -0.3 -7.7 -12.6 -21.4 -44.6 -11.9 -38.9 -72.1 -77.5 -581.6 
45p MUP 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -2.6 -4.2 -1.6 -14.6 -22.5 -36.9 -70.7 -16.8 -56.3 -124.6 -127.0 -841.1 
50p MUP 0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -4.3 -6.9 -3.6 -24.0 -37.2 -56.9 -102.7 -26.4 -78.0 -193.7 -191.8 -1,118.9 
55p MUP 0.2 -1.3 -2.9 -6.8 -10.8 -7.7 -37.2 -56.5 -82.6 -141.1 -41.9 -110.5 -282.4 -280.8 -1,280.8 
60p MUP -0.1 -2.7 -4.9 -10.0 -15.6 -15.0 -55.4 -82.0 -113.6 -186.2 -68.4 -152.5 -383.0 -369.4 -1,458.6 
65p MUP -0.8 -4.6 -7.5 -13.8 -21.2 -24.9 -77.5 -112.0 -148.2 -234.3 -99.6 -200.8 -483.2 -472.7 -1,639.9 
70p MUP -1.9 -6.9 -10.7 -18.2 -27.1 -37.5 -101.3 -144.6 -186.4 -276.2 -133.4 -259.2 -590.7 -583.0 -1,837.2 
       
    
   
    
   
  
Relative 
change 
35p MUP 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.4% -0.6% 0.0% -0.2% -0.4% -0.8% -2.0% -0.2% -0.5% -0.9% -0.8% -8.0% 
40p MUP 0.0% 0.0% -0.2% -0.8% -1.3% 0.0% -0.6% -1.0% -1.8% -3.7% -0.3% -0.9% -2.2% -1.9% -13.3% 
45p MUP 0.1% -0.1% -0.4% -1.3% -2.2% -0.1% -1.2% -1.8% -3.0% -5.8% -0.4% -1.4% -3.8% -3.1% -19.3% 
50p MUP 0.1% -0.2% -0.7% -2.2% -3.6% -0.3% -1.9% -2.9% -4.7% -8.4% -0.7% -1.9% -6.0% -4.7% -25.6% 
55p MUP 0.1% -0.6% -1.3% -3.4% -5.5% -0.6% -3.0% -4.5% -6.8% -11.6% -1.1% -2.7% -8.7% -6.9% -29.3% 
60p MUP -0.1% -1.3% -2.3% -5.0% -8.0% -1.2% -4.5% -6.5% -9.3% -15.3% -1.8% -3.7% -11.8% -9.1% -33.4% 
65p MUP 
-0.4% -2.2% -3.5% -6.9% -10.9% -2.0% -6.2% -8.9% 
-
12.2% 
-19.3% -2.6% -4.8% -14.9% -11.6% -37.6% 
70p MUP 
-0.8% -3.3% -5.0% -9.1% -14.0% -3.1% -8.1% 
-
11.5% 
-
15.3% 
-22.7% -3.4% -6.2% -18.2% -14.3% -42.1% 
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Table 50: Proportion of total reduction in consumption under MUP policies accounted for by population subgroups 
 
Population 
Reduction in consumption 
35p MUP 40p MUP 45p MUP 50p MUP 55p MUP 60p MUP 65p MUP 70p MUP 
Population 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
        
      
  
Moderate 72% 6% 6% 7% 8% 10% 11% 12% 14% 
Hazardous 24% 31% 35% 38% 40% 43% 45% 47% 47% 
Harmful 4% 62% 59% 55% 52% 48% 44% 41% 39% 
        
      
  
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 22% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 
WIMD Q2 21% 7% 9% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
WIMD Q3 21% 12% 15% 16% 18% 20% 21% 22% 22% 
WIMD Q4 19% 16% 19% 20% 21% 22% 22% 23% 23% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 16% 63% 57% 53% 50% 45% 41% 38% 35% 
        
      
  
Moderate 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WIMD Q2 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
WIMD Q3 15% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
WIMD Q4 14% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 12% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 
Hazardous 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 6% -1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 
WIMD Q2 5% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
WIMD Q3 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 11% 
WIMD Q4 4% 8% 10% 10% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 3% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 12% 
Harmful 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
WIMD Q2 1% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
WIMD Q3 1% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 8% 
WIMD Q4 1% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 1% 46% 40% 36% 33% 27% 23% 20% 18% 
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Table 51: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD 
Q1 (least 
deprived
) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived
) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD 
Q5 
(most 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 
297,937 
286,32
2 
290,24
8 
266,50
3 
238,332 112,441 
102,03
1 
99,177 80,181 55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 12,221 
Baseline spending 
per drinker per year 
£375 £296 £265 £228 £198 £1,483 £1,209 £1,117 £1,099 £981 £3,060 £3,646 £2,380 £2,455 £2,715 
       
    
   
    
   
  
Absolute 
change 
in 
annual 
spendin
g per 
drinker 
35p 
MUP 
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £3 £2 £1 -£1 -£3 £14 £15 £9 £19 -£41 
40p 
MUP 
£1 £1 £1 £0 £0 £6 £5 £3 £0 -£4 £27 £32 £16 £33 -£86 
45p 
MUP 
£2 £2 £2 £1 £1 £13 £11 £9 £4 -£4 £51 £68 £32 £63 -£141 
50p 
MUP 
£4 £4 £3 £2 £2 £25 £21 £20 £12 -£1 £88 £120 £56 £107 -£206 
55p 
MUP 
£7 £6 £6 £3 £3 £42 £35 £35 £22 £1 £137 £187 £82 £158 -£214 
60p 
MUP 
£10 £8 £8 £5 £5 £62 £50 £50 £30 £0 £193 £259 £106 £221 -£235 
65p 
MUP 
£14 £11 £11 £7 £5 £83 £66 £63 £36 -£4 £255 £340 £129 £280 -£267 
70p 
MUP 
£18 £14 £13 £8 £6 £105 £81 £75 £38 -£7 £321 £417 £143 £332 -£320 
       
    
   
    
   
  
Relative 
change 
35p 
MUP 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% -0.1% -0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% -1.5% 
40p 
MUP 
0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% -0.4% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 1.3% -3.2% 
45p 
MUP 
0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.4% -0.4% 1.7% 1.9% 1.3% 2.6% -5.2% 
50p 
MUP 
1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 0.8% 1.1% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.1% -0.1% 2.9% 3.3% 2.4% 4.4% -7.6% 
55p 
MUP 
1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 1.5% 1.7% 2.8% 2.9% 3.1% 2.0% 0.1% 4.5% 5.1% 3.4% 6.4% -7.9% 
60p 
MUP 
2.6% 2.8% 3.0% 2.3% 2.3% 4.2% 4.1% 4.4% 2.7% 0.0% 6.3% 7.1% 4.4% 9.0% -8.7% 
65p 
MUP 
3.7% 3.7% 4.0% 3.0% 2.7% 5.6% 5.4% 5.6% 3.3% -0.4% 8.3% 9.3% 5.4% 11.4% -9.8% 
70p 
MUP 
4.8% 4.7% 4.9% 3.5% 2.9% 7.1% 6.7% 6.7% 3.5% -0.7% 10.5% 11.4% 6.0% 13.5% -11.8% 
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Table 52: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable deaths by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD 
Q5 
(most 
deprived
) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline annual 
alcohol-attributable 
mortality per 100,000 
drinkers 
-4 -6 -7 -7 -4 46 57 72 77 97 444 444 512 804 1,502 
  
 
  
    
Absolute 
change 
in deaths 
per 
100,000 
drinkers 
per year 
35p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -4 -2 -2 -4 -8 -76 
40p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -2 -3 -7 -2 -5 -11 -18 -121 
45p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -3 -5 -11 -3 -7 -22 -30 -174 
50p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -4 -8 -15 -4 -12 -37 -45 -243 
55p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -7 -11 -20 -6 -18 -56 -63 -277 
60p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -9 -15 -26 -10 -25 -77 -85 -318 
65p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -6 -13 -19 -32 -15 -33 -99 -109 -364 
70p MUP 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -7 -16 -23 -36 -19 -45 -120 -132 -413 
  
  
 
  
  
Relative 
change 
35p MUP 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.2% -1.4% 0.3% -0.4% -1.0% -1.7% -3.9% -0.3% -0.5% -0.8% -1.0% -5.1% 
40p MUP -0.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.5% -2.1% 0.4% -1.0% -2.3% -3.7% -7.1% -0.5% -1.0% -2.1% -2.3% -8.1% 
45p MUP -0.2% -0.1% 0.2% 0.8% -2.7% 0.5% -1.8% -3.9% -6.4% -11.0% -0.6% -1.7% -4.3% -3.7% -11.6% 
50p MUP -0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 1.4% -3.4% 0.5% -2.8% -6.2% -9.8% -15.6% -0.9% -2.6% -7.2% -5.6% -16.2% 
55p MUP 
-0.5% 0.4% 0.8% 2.3% -0.8% 0.3% -4.3% -9.1% 
-
14.0
% 
-20.8% -1.4% -4.1% -10.9% -7.9% -18.5% 
60p MUP 
-0.3% 1.0% 1.6% 3.6% 2.9% -0.5% -6.8% -12.9% 
-
19.1
% 
-26.8% -2.3% -5.7% -15.0% 
-
10.6
% 
-21.1% 
65p MUP 
0.0% 1.8% 2.6% 5.1% 7.4% -1.6% -9.9% -17.3% 
-
24.7
% 
-32.7% -3.3% -7.5% -19.3% 
-
13.6
% 
-24.2% 
70p MUP 
0.6% 2.8% 3.8% 6.7% 11.4% -3.2% -13.0% -21.8% 
-
30.6
% 
-37.4% -4.4% -10.0% -23.4% 
-
16.5
% 
-27.5% 
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Table 53: Proportion of total reduction in alcohol-attributable deaths under MUP policies accounted for by population subgroups 
 
Population 
Reduction in alcohol-attributable deaths 
35p MUP 40p MUP 45p MUP 50p MUP 55p MUP 60p MUP 65p MUP 70p MUP 
Population 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
        
      
  
Moderate 72% -1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
Hazardous 24% 25% 28% 30% 31% 33% 35% 37% 37% 
Harmful 4% 76% 72% 70% 69% 66% 64% 62% 60% 
        
      
  
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 22% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 
WIMD Q2 21% 4% 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
WIMD Q3 21% 9% 12% 15% 17% 19% 20% 21% 22% 
WIMD Q4 19% 15% 18% 19% 20% 22% 23% 23% 24% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 16% 71% 64% 60% 57% 52% 47% 44% 42% 
        
      
  
Moderate 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WIMD Q2 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WIMD Q3 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WIMD Q4 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 12% -1% -1% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Hazardous 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 6% -1% -1% -1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
WIMD Q2 5% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
WIMD Q3 5% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 9% 9% 
WIMD Q4 4% 7% 8% 9% 9% 10% 10% 11% 11% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 3% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 
Harmful 
WIMD Q1 (least deprived) 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
WIMD Q2 1% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 
WIMD Q3 1% 4% 7% 8% 10% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
WIMD Q4 1% 8% 10% 10% 10% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
WIMD Q5 (most deprived) 1% 59% 52% 47% 45% 39% 34% 31% 30% 
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Table 54: Estimated impact of MUP policies on alcohol-attributable admissions by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD 
Q5 
(most 
deprive
d) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Baseline annual 
alcohol-attributable 
hospital 
admissions per 
100,000 drinkers 
810 942 1,106 1,304 1,575 3,133 3,321 3,848 3,612 3,437 2,013 2,008 2,129 2,774 3,628 
                                
Absolute 
change 
in 
admissio
n per 
100,000 
drinkers 
per year 
35p 
MUP 
-0.3 0.0 -1.6 -9.1 -13.3 4.0 -6.3 -19.8 -30.3 -55.6 -1.8 -4.3 -9.4 -17.7 -96.3 
40p 
MUP 
0.2 -0.5 -3.4 -15.9 -26.7 3.4 -16.2 -43.8 -65.3 -103.7 -2.7 -11.6 -35.2 -42.0 -153.3 
45p 
MUP 
1.8 -1.4 -6.8 -26.3 -45.9 1.3 -29.0 -75.9 -113.7 -165.8 -6.9 -16.2 -68.5 -78.8 -225.4 
50p 
MUP 
3.2 -3.8 -12.9 -42.2 -75.6 -1.7 -47.3 -123.7 -176.0 -241.5 -9.2 -29.0 -96.8 -119.7 -305.1 
55p 
MUP 
4.5 -9.1 -23.0 -65.7 -122.9 -10.2 -74.6 -186.9 -254.1 -331.9 -16.7 -51.6 -140.0 -167.5 -357.5 
60p 
MUP 
4.0 -17.9 -38.6 -96.6 -183.6 -27.3 -118.5 -273.1 -348.4 -440.8 -26.1 -72.7 -190.3 -230.5 -415.7 
65p 
MUP 
1.4 -30.3 -59.1 -133.4 -253.1 -51.3 -174.5 -371.0 -451.8 -553.6 -43.2 -96.8 -248.6 -310.5 -490.8 
70p 
MUP 
-3.5 -45.2 -83.2 -174.8 -322.4 -82.0 -232.0 -473.2 -563.7 -650.9 -61.2 -133.0 -318.0 -366.3 -565.5 
                                
Relative 
change 
35p 
MUP 
0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.7% -0.8% 0.1% -0.2% -0.5% -0.8% -1.6% -0.1% -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -2.7% 
40p 
MUP 
0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -1.2% -1.7% 0.1% -0.5% -1.1% -1.8% -3.0% -0.1% -0.6% -1.7% -1.5% -4.2% 
45p 
MUP 
0.2% -0.2% -0.6% -2.0% -2.9% 0.0% -0.9% -2.0% -3.1% -4.8% -0.3% -0.8% -3.2% -2.8% -6.2% 
50p 
MUP 
0.4% -0.4% -1.2% -3.2% -4.8% -0.1% -1.4% -3.2% -4.9% -7.0% -0.5% -1.4% -4.5% -4.3% -8.4% 
55p 
MUP 
0.6% -1.0% -2.1% -5.0% -7.8% -0.3% -2.2% -4.9% -7.0% -9.7% -0.8% -2.6% -6.6% -6.0% -9.9% 
60p 
MUP 
0.5% -1.9% -3.5% -7.4% -11.7% -0.9% -3.6% -7.1% -9.6% -12.8% -1.3% -3.6% -8.9% -8.3% -11.5% 
65p 
MUP 
0.2% -3.2% -5.3% 
-
10.2% 
-16.1% -1.6% -5.3% -9.6% -12.5% -16.1% -2.1% -4.8% -11.7% -11.2% -13.5% 
70p 
MUP 
-0.4% -4.8% -7.5% 
-
13.4% 
-20.5% -2.6% -7.0% -12.3% -15.6% -18.9% -3.0% -6.6% -14.9% -13.2% -15.6% 
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Table 55: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on consumption by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 297,937 
286,32
2 
290,24
8 
266,50
3 
238,332 112,441 
102,03
1 
99,177 80,181 55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 12,221 
Baseline 
consumption per 
drinker per year 
231 211 213 200 194 1,228 1,245 1,262 1,219 1,216 3,892 4,168 3,244 4,081 4,367 
  
                
Absolute 
change 
(units 
per 
drinker 
per year) 
50p 
MUP 
0 -1 -2 -4 -7 -4 -24 -37 -57 -103 -26 -78 -194 -192 -1119 
33.04% 
tax rise 
-4 -6 -6 -8 -10 -34 -50 -57 -66 -78 -87 -94 -195 -196 -395 
34.06% 
tax rise 
-4 -6 -6 -8 -10 -35 -52 -58 -68 -81 -90 -97 -202 -203 -408 
46.56% 
tax rise 
-6 -8 -9 -12 -14 -49 -72 -82 -95 -112 -127 -139 -281 -285 -567 
48.26% 
tax rise 
-6 -8 -9 -12 -14 -51 -75 -85 -98 -116 -132 -145 -292 -297 -589 
    
               
Relative 
change 
50p 
MUP 
0% 0% -1% -2% -4% 0% -2% -3% -5% -8% -1% -2% -6% -5% -26% 
33.04% 
tax rise 
-2% -3% -3% -4% -5% -3% -4% -4% -5% -6% -2% -2% -6% -5% -9% 
34.06% 
tax rise 
-2% -3% -3% -4% -5% -3% -4% -5% -6% -7% -2% -2% -6% -5% -9% 
46.56% 
tax rise 
-2% -4% -4% -6% -7% -4% -6% -6% -8% -9% -3% -3% -9% -7% -13% 
48.26% 
tax rise 
-2% -4% -4% -6% -7% -4% -6% -7% -8% -10% -3% -3% -9% -7% -13% 
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Table 56: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on spending by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD Q1 
(least 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD 
Q5 
(most 
deprived
) 
Drinker population 
297,937 286,322 290,248 266,503 238,332 112,441 102,031 
99,17
7 
80,181 55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 12,221 
Baseline spending per drinker per year £375 £296 £265 £228 £198 £1,483 £1,209 
£1,11
7 
£1,099 £981 £3,060 £3,646 £2,380 £2,455 £2,715 
  
 
               
Absolute change per drinker per 
year 
50p MUP £4 £4 £3 £2 £2 £25 £21 £20 £12 -£1 £88 £120 £56 £107 -£206 
33.04% tax rise £22 £16 £16 £12 £11 £95 £77 £75 £56 £45 £230 £338 £152 £220 £108 
34.06% tax rise £23 £16 £17 £13 £11 £98 £79 £77 £58 £46 £236 £348 £156 £226 £110 
46.56% tax rise £31 £22 £22 £17 £15 £132 £105 £102 £75 £59 £315 £465 £202 £296 £131 
48.26% tax rise £32 £23 £23 £17 £15 £136 £108 £105 £77 £61 £325 £480 £208 £305 £133 
                   
Relative change 
50p MUP 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 0% 3% 3% 2% 4% -8% 
33.04% tax rise 6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 5% 5% 8% 9% 6% 9% 4% 
34.06% tax rise 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 5% 5% 8% 10% 7% 9% 4% 
46.56% tax rise 8% 7% 8% 7% 7% 9% 9% 9% 7% 6% 10% 13% 8% 12% 5% 
48.26% tax rise 8% 8% 9% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 7% 6% 11% 13% 9% 12% 5% 
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Table 57: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on alcohol-attributable mortality by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 
297,937 
286,32
2 
290,24
8 
266,50
3 
238,332 112,441 
102,03
1 
99,177 80,181 55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 12,221 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per year 
-12 -17 -19 -20 -9 52 59 72 61 54 81 82 88 123 184 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable deaths 
per 100,00 
drinkers per year 
-4 -6 -7 -7 -4 46 57 72 77 97 444 444 512 804 1,502 
  
 
               
Absolut
e 
change 
in 
alcohol
-
attribut
able 
deaths 
50p 
MUP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -1 -2 -6 -7 -30 
33.04% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 -1 -1 -3 -5 -8 -8 -8 -3 -4 -7 -7 -11 
34.06% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 -1 -1 -3 -5 -8 -9 -8 -3 -4 -7 -7 -11 
46.56% 
tax rise 
0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -7 -11 -12 -11 -4 -6 -10 -10 -15 
48.26% 
tax rise 
0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -8 -11 -12 -11 -4 -6 -11 -11 -16 
  
                 
Absolut
e 
change 
in 
alcohol
-
attribut
able 
deaths 
per 
100,000 
drinker
s 
50p 
MUP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -4 -8 -15 -4 -12 -37 -45 -243 
33.04% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 0 0 -3 -5 -8 -11 -14 -16 -22 -40 -46 -89 
34.06% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 0 0 -3 -5 -8 -11 -14 -16 -23 -42 -48 -92 
46.56% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 0 0 -4 -7 -11 -15 -20 -23 -32 -59 -66 -125 
48.26% 
tax rise 
0 0 0 0 -1 -4 -7 -12 -16 -20 -24 -33 -61 -69 -130 
  
 
               
Relativ
e 
change 
50p 
MUP 
0% 0% 0% 1% -3% 1% -3% -6% -10% -16% -1% -3% -7% -6% -16% 
33.04% 
tax rise 
2% 2% 2% 3% 9% -6% -9% -11% -14% -14% -4% -5% -8% -6% -6% 
34.06% 
tax rise 
2% 3% 3% 3% 9% -6% -9% -11% -14% -15% -4% -5% -8% -6% -6% 
46.56% 
tax rise 
3% 4% 4% 4% 13% -8% -13% -15% -20% -20% -5% -7% -12% -8% -8% 
48.26% 
tax rise 
3% 4% 4% 4% 13% -8% -13% -16% -20% -21% -5% -7% -12% -9% -9% 
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Table 58: Estimated impact of MUP and taxation policies on alcohol-attributable hospital admissions by drinker group and deprivation 
 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
WIMD 
Q1 
(least 
deprive
d) 
WIMD 
Q2 
WIMD 
Q3 
WIMD 
Q4 
WIMD Q5 
(most 
deprived) 
Drinker population 
 
297,93
7 
286,32
2 
290,24
8 
266,503 238,332 
112,44
1 
102,03
1 
99,177 80,181 55,509 18,234 18,365 17,267 15,304 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable 
admissions per 
year 
 
810 942 1,106 1,304 1,575 3,133 3,321 3,848 3,612 3,437 2,013 2,008 2,129 2,774 
Baseline alcohol-
attributable 
admissions per 
100,00 drinkers 
per year 
 
272 329 381 489 661 2,787 3,255 3,879 4,505 6,192 11,042 10,932 12,330 18,127 
                 
Absolut
e 
change 
in 
alcohol
-
attribut
able 
admissi
ons 
 
50p 
MUP 
3 -4 -13 -42 -76 -2 -47 -124 -176 -241 -9 -29 -97 -120 -305 
33.04% 
tax rise 
-23 -42 -53 -80 -126 -93 -141 -208 -234 -214 -45 -68 -116 -120 -127 
34.06% 
tax rise 
-23 -44 -55 -82 -130 -96 -145 -214 -242 -221 -46 -70 -119 -124 -130 
46.56% 
tax rise 
-33 -61 -76 -114 -180 -135 -204 -298 -335 -305 -64 -99 -157 -167 -176 
48.26% 
tax rise 
-35 -63 -79 -119 -187 -140 -212 -310 -348 -316 -66 -104 -162 -173 -183 
                 
Absolut
e 
change 
in 
alcohol
-
attribut
able 
admissi
ons per 
100,000 
drinker
s 
 
50p 
MUP 
1 -1 -4 -16 -32 -2 -46 -125 -219 -435 -51 -158 -560 -782 -2,497 
33.04% 
tax rise 
-8 -15 -18 -30 -53 -82 -138 -209 -292 -385 -245 -371 -672 -787 -1,038 
34.06% 
tax rise 
-8 -15 -19 -31 -55 -85 -142 -216 -301 -398 -253 -382 -689 -809 -1,067 
46.56% 
tax rise 
-11 -21 -26 -43 -76 -120 -200 -301 -418 -549 -350 -539 -909 -1,094 -1,443 
48.26% 
tax rise 
-12 -22 -27 -45 -79 -125 -208 -312 -434 -570 -363 -566 -941 -1,134 -1,495 
                 
Relativ
e 
change 
 
50p 
MUP 
0% 0% -1% -3% -5% 0% -1% -3% -5% -7% 0% -1% -5% -4% -8% 
33.04% 
tax rise 
-3% -4% -5% -6% -8% -3% -4% -5% -6% -6% -2% -3% -5% -4% -3% 
34.06% 
tax rise 
-3% -5% -5% -6% -8% -3% -4% -6% -7% -6% -2% -3% -6% -4% -4% 
46.56% 
tax rise 
-4% -6% -7% -9% -11% -4% -6% -8% -9% -9% -3% -5% -7% -6% -5% 
48.26% 
tax rise 
-4% -7% -7% -9% -12% -4% -6% -8% -10% -9% -3% -5% -8% -6% -5% 
 
